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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)G) (2009) because the Supreme Court of Utah transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPELLANTS' APPEAL
Appellants have selected three issues for appeal. Appellee is dissatisfied with these
issues, and their respective standards of review, as more particularly described in the
Argument section of the Brief of Appellee.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPELLEE'S CROSS-APPEAL
1.

Whether, the trial court erred by failing to award Peterson his 36.37 percent

interest in the undistributed excess cash PAJ had on hand as of the judicially determined
valuation date, December 31, 2006. (R. at 572, 616-620).
Standard of Review: Denovo.
Authority for Standard of Review: The determination of whether a given fact or
circumstance is relevant to fair value under state law is a question of law which an appellate
court reviews de novo. Hogle v. Zinetics Med., Inc., 2002 UT 121, ^[10, 63 P.3d 80 {quoting
Swope v. Siegel-Robert, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir. Mo. 2001)).
2.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Peterson prejudgment interest

at the rate often percent per annum. (R. at 572, 621-622).
Standard of Review: Correctness

1

Authority for Standard of Review: The trial court's award of prejudgment interest,
and the amount thereof, presents a question of law which an appellate court reviews for
correctness. Kealamakia, Inc. v. Kealamakia, 2009 UT App 148, ^[4, 213 P.3d 13 {quoting
Trail Ml Coal Co. v. UtahDiv. of State Lands & Forestry, 884P.2d 1265,1271-72 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994)).
3.

Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Peterson his costs and attorney

fees due to the Remaining Shareholders' breach of their fiduciary duties and oppressive
conduct and/ or their misapplication or waste of corporate assets. (R. at 572, 622-624).
Standard of Review: Correctness
Authority for Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action
is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews for correctness. Kealamakia, 2009 UT
App 148 at f3; see also Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). Likewise,
whether the trial court's findings of fact in support of an award of fees are sufficient is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness. Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315. Further, as to
underlying determinations, appellate courts review legal questions, such as the scope of
shareholder's fiduciary duties, for correctness. McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, ][14,220
P.3d 146.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
Attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE RELEVANT TO CROSS-APPEAL
A.

Nature of the Case
This cross-appeal arises from the final judgment entered by the First District Court,

Cache County, State of Utah, the Honorable Kevin K. Allen presiding (R. at 977-81, attached
to Brief of Appellant as Exhibit A). This action concerns several related issues between the
three shareholders of a professional corporation, Peterson Allred Jackson P.C. ("PAJ" or
"Corporation"). These issues all stem from the efforts of two shareholders, Alan D. Allred
("Alfred") and D. Scott Jackson ("Jackson" and collectively the "Remaining Shareholders"),
to freeze out, terminate, and destroy the equity, employment, management, and investment
expectation of a founding shareholder, Jack W. Peterson ("Peterson"), in the Corporation.
The turmoil caused by the Remaining Shareholders left Peterson no option but to file for
dissolution. Instead of dissolution, PAJ and the Remaining Shareholders elected to purchase
Peterson's shares under the statutory allowance. It should be noted that the reference to
"PAJ" hereinafter includes, in most instances, the "Remaining Shareholders," inasmuch as
the Remaining Shareholders controlled PAJ.
The court's April 17, 2009 Decision (the "Decision") found that PAJ and the
Remaining Shareholders had conceded that the Corporation must be dissolved, and then
elected under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434 to purchase Peterson's shares in lieu of
dissolution. (R. at 614). The Decision adjudicated six issues stipulated by the parties to be
the only issues for trial. (R. at 572, 616-626). First, the fair value of Peterson's shares was
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determined to be $459,000.00. (R. at 619,625). Second, an investment practice operated by
Peterson while employed by PAJ was determined to belong to Peterson individually. Id at
620-621, 625. Third, Peterson was awarded prejudgment interest from and after December
31, 2006. Id at 621-622, 625. Fourth, the trial court determined that the Remaining
Shareholders of PAJ did not engage in oppressive conduct or misapplication or wasting of
corporate assets entitling Peterson to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Id at 622-624,
625. Fifth, PAJ was deemed entitled to an off-set of the stipulated amount of $4,929.94
representing income Peterson received while employed at Utah State University, but was
denied an off-set for Peterson's passive investment income. Id at 624,625. Finally, the trial
court concluded that neither PAJ nor the Remaining Shareholders were entitled to any
damages on their counterclaim. Id
Peterson appeals the ruling of the First District Court as to the valuation of Peterson's
shares, only to the extent that the trial court failed to award Peterson his 36.37 percent
interest in the undistributed cash PAJ had on hand as of the December 31, 2006 valuation
date. Peterson also appeals the trial court's determination of the rate of prejudgment interest
awarded, and the trial court's determination that the Remaining Shareholders' conduct was
not oppressive and/or did not constitute a misapplication or wasting of corporate assets.
B.

Relevant Course of Proceedings
Peterson, individually and derivatively on behalf of PAJ, filed a Verified Complaint

against Jackson and Allred in this matter on November 2, 2006, seeking among other claims
dissolution of the corporation. (R. at 1-8). On November 6,2006, PAJ, Allred, and Jackson
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acknowledged that PAJ must be dissolved and elected under Utah Code Ann. §16-1 Oa-1434
to purchase Peterson's shares in lieu of dissolution for fair value. (R. at 66-67).
The parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the fair value of Peterson's shares
under the procedures of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(3). (R. at 570). The court established
the valuation date to be December 31, 2006, and instructed each party to have prepared and
simultaneously file expert valuation reports asserting the fair value of Peterson's shares as of
December 31,2006. (R. at 421,436-437). Peterson's expert, R. Brad Townsend, of Norman
Townsend and Johnson, ("Townsend") concluded that Peterson was entitled to $505,625.00.
(R. at 570). Peterson's 36.37 percent interest in PAJ, excluding consideration of PAJ's
undistributed cash, was valued at $459,000, and Peterson's 36.37 percent interest in PAJ's
undistributed cash was valued at $46,625.00; for a total sum of $505,625.00 ("Townsend
Report"). Id. PAJ's expert, Tyler J. Bowles ("Bowles"), valued Peterson's 36.37 percent
interest in PAJ at $224,639.00 ("Bowles Report"). Id.
A Stipulated Pretrial Order was entered into between the parties and approved by the
trial court at the commencement of trial. (R. at 569-573). The parties stipulated that the
Defendants would pay the amount, which the court after trial adjudicated to be owing to
Peterson, within ten business days following the entry of judgment. (R. at 569-570). The
parties stipulated to a Statement of Undisputed Facts. (R. at 570-572). The parties also
stipulated to the six issues of dispute which needed resolution by the trial court. (R. at 572).
Further, the parties stipulated to bifurcate the issue of costs and attorney fees, should the
Court determine that such were warranted. Id. Trial was held on this matter before the First
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District Court, County of Cache, the Honorable Kevin K. Allen presiding, on February 18,
19, and 20, 2009.
C.

Disposition by the Court Below
In accordance with the parties' stipulation, the trial court, in the April 17, 2009

Decision, decided six issues, three of which are relevant to Peterson's cross-appeal (R. at
625).
First, the trial court adopted the Townsend Report and determined that it was more
reliable than the Bowles Report. (R. at 619). The Townsend Report opined Peterson was
entitled to $505,625.00, comprised of Peterson's 36.37 percent interest in PAJ excluding
PAJ's undistributed cash reserve equaling $459,000.00, and Peterson's 36.37% interest in
PAJ's $128,196.00 undistributed cash reserve equaling $46,625.00. (R. at 618-620; see also
Trial Exhibit 90 at 27-28.) However, the trial court awarded Peterson only $459,000.00, and
denied Peterson his share of PAJ's ''undistributed cash reserve," even though the
undistributed cash reserves were unambiguously segregated from the $459,000.00 figure as
explained in the Townsend Report. Id.
Second, the Decision awarded Peterson prejudgment interest relating back to the
valuation date of December 31,2006, because the damage was complete as of a certain time
and Peterson's loss was able to be "measured by facts and figures to a mathematical
- certainty." (R. at 621-622). However, the trial court did not apply the statutory prejudgment
interest rate of ten percent. Id. Rather, the court posited that equity allows the court to
deviate from the statutory mandated prejudgment interest rate often percent and, thus, the
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trial court without further explanation applied the post-judgment interest rates set by the State
of Utah; specifically, 6.99 percent for 2007,5.42 percent for 2008, and 2.40 percent for 2009,
to compute Peterson's prejudgment interest. Id.
Third, even though the trial court found that the Defendants (PAJ and Remaining
Shareholders) had denied Peterson's access to and production of corporate records and
information, that computer passwords were changed to prevent Peterson's access to
corporate information, that employees and clients were solicited by and instructed to side
with the Remaining Shareholders, that Peterson was evicted from his office, that Peterson
was removed both physically and emotionally from the firm he helped start, and, further, that
the Remaining Shareholders' actions were insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, and overly
aggressive; the trial court, nevertheless, determined that the Remaining Shareholders' actions
were not "oppressive". (R. at 622-624). The court based its determination that the
Remaining Shareholders' actions were not oppressive on the belief that shareholders have the
right to make decisions they deem in the best interest of the company, "however unpleasant
they may be." (R. at 623). Further, the court determined that Defendant Jackson's fiscally
unsound billing practices did not rise to the level of a misapplication or waste of corporate
assets. (R. at 624). Because the trial court determined the Remaining Shareholders' actions
did not constitute oppression or a misapplication or wasting of assets, Peterson was denied an
award of attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
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D.

Statement of Facts
1.

Peterson incorporates by reference each fact located in Appellants' Statement

of Facts except the following: 4, 5, 6, and 7.
2.

To the extent not stated below, the stipulated facts contained in the Stipulated

Pretrial Order dated February 18,2009 are incorporated herein by this reference. (R. at 569573).
3.

In 2006, disagreements arose between the owners of PAJ which resulted in

this dissolution and election to purchase in lieu of dissolution action. (R. at 1-8, 43, 614).
4.

Peterson's expert, Brad Townsend ("Townsend"), valued Peterson's 36.37

percent share in PAJ at $505,625.00. (R. at 614).
5.

The Remaining Shareholders were in control of the corporation for all times

relevant to the disputes which were adjudicated at trial. (R. at 622-624).
6.

Neither PAJ's articles of incorporation, nor any other agreement between the

parties, specify a specific rate of interest that is to be applied in the case of a buyout of a
shareholder's shares, or any other obligation owing to one of the parties. (R. at 621-622);
Trial Exhibits 1-7.
7.

The trial court found Peterson was entitled to prejudgment interest. (R. at 621 -

622). Despite the fact that no agreement between the parties specified a specific rate of
interest to be applied in a buyout, the trial court did not apply the statutory prejudgment
interest rate often percent. Id; Trial Exhibits 1-7. Rather, the trial court adopted and
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applied the post-judgment interest rates for guidance and awarded Peterson interest in the
amount of 6.99 percent for 2007, 5.42 percent for 2008, and 2.40 percent for 2009. Id
8.

The Remaining Shareholders engaged in actions against Peterson which were

selective, insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, and overly aggressive. (R. at 623-624).
9.

From approximately May or June of 2006 until the termination of Peterson

from the Corporation, the Remaining Shareholders conspired to influence employees and
clients of the Corporation against Peterson and to take sides with Jackson and Allred. (R. at
43-44). Key employees were told that Peterson would be terminated or would no longer be
with the firm. Id.
10.

Between September and December 2006, the Remaining Shareholders initiated

special corporate meetings to change officers and to change management and procedures of
the Corporation in their favor, so as to justify and ratify the oppressive abuses complained of
by Peterson, and to attempt to effectuate an inequitable dissolution of the Corporation. (R. at
45-46).
11.

The Corporation had a longstanding policy requiring that each employee

maintain daily records of their work time and billings, and that all work in progress and
billable time be promptly and fully recorded. (R. at 43-44). All employees, including
Jackson, were to bill clients on an hourly basis, unless a specific exception was otherwise
agreed upon. Id.
12.

Particularly during the time of controversy in 2006, Jackson failed to maintain

his time and billing records as is required by policy, and acted contrary to the interests of the
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Corporation and Peterson. Id. Allred justified this conduct by suggesting that it was more
important for Jackson to provide services to clients than to keep current and accurate records
or to process accurate and timely billings. (R. at 56-57).
13.

For approximately three months (June through August), PAJ failed to pay

Peterson's salary. (R. at 45). In 2006, PAJ also failed to proportionally distribute available
profits and dividends. (R. at 618, 620). Instead PAJ withheld those funds, amounting to
$128,196.00 until after Peterson was terminated. Id.
14.

On November 1, 2006, the Remaining Shareholders directed that Peterson be

denied access to the computer and to company records. Trial Exhibit 177 at 3.
15.

In December of 2006, while Peterson was in California, the lock to his office

was changed and he was no longer allowed access. (T. Vol. II at 348-350). Within his office
were his personal notes and records, including some which were applicable to this litigation.
Id. Also within his office was a substantial amount of his other personal property. Id.
Peterson was prevented at that time from obtaining his personal property. Id. There was a
long delay and controversy about returning Peterson's property. Id. Some property was never
returned. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

Brief of Appellee (Response to Brief of Appellants)
PAJ, in its Brief of Appellants, attempts to circumvent the marshaling requirement by

"contending] that as a matter of law, the trial court committed several errors in reaching its
conclusions as to the 'fair value' of Peterson's shares." See Brief of Appellants at 5. While
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PAJ attempts to couch its arguments as matters of law, it is essentially arguing the trial
court's ultimate factual determination as to the fair value of PAJ was incorrect and that the
trial court placed improper weight on certain items of evidence, specifically, the Townsend
Report. PAJ has an obligation to satisfy the requisites of the marshaling requirement as to
the fair value of PAJ if it wishes to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as a factual
matter. PAJ should not be allowed to avoid the marshalling requirement and challenge the
trial court's evidence weighing processes by couching its factual contentions as legal
arguments; which it does by suggesting that the findings supporting the trial court's
conclusion were insufficient.
PAJ's contentions that the trial court's findings of fact were insufficient as a matter of
law were not preserved at the trial court level. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
assertions which claim findings of fact are "inaccurate" and "incomplete" does not indicate
that the findings themselves were insufficiently detailed to disclose how the court reached its
decision, and that such does not adequately preserve the sufficiency of the findings argument
for appeal. At the trial level, PAJ did not challenge the sufficiency of the findings made, but
only requested additional findings be made to satisfy Defendant's assertions that the trial
court's findings were inaccurate and/ or incomplete. Such is not adequate to preserve PAJ's
sufficiency argument for appeal.
Even if the sufficiency argument has been preserved in the trial court, in order to be
sufficient, findings need only include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion was reached. Findings need only be made on material issues.

11

Conflicting evidentiary issues need not be resolved, nor do any or all factual allegations need
be addressed. If the "ultimate facts" are addressed, the findings are sufficient. The "ultimate
fact" that needed to be sufficiently addressed by the trial court's findings was the fair value
of Peterson's shares. The trial court's Decision, Judgment, Memorandum Decision, and
Second Judgment, and incorporation therein of the Townsend and Bowles Reports, clearly
demonstrate the court's decision making process. The Townsend Report was more credible
than the Bowles Report, and, therefore, relied upon by the trial court in its fair value
determination. The trial court's findings of fact were sufficient as a matter of law.
Goodwill was also properly considered by the trial court. Because PAJ is not a sole
proprietorship and is not dependent upon Jackson or Allred or any other person for its
existence and continuance, it was appropriate for the trial court to include institutional
goodwill in the valuation of PAJ. Further, Townsend's Report did not include personal
goodwill, and therefore, the trial court did not include any personal goodwill in its fair value
determination. PAJ's owners all entered into a non-solicitation agreement which converted
personal goodwill into enterprise goodwill. The Townsend Report also allowed for a fair
market salary for both Allred and Jackson to account for any personal goodwill in making its
final valuation of PAJ.
Finally, in order for this court to remand this case to the trial court to correct a
mathematical error under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), this court must determine that
the trial court made a clerical error. A clerical error is one in which the trial court intended to
pronounce one thing in its judgment, but erroneously pronounced something different or
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contrary to its intentions. Such did not occur in the present case. The trial court heard
evidence from both sides regarding Jackson's 2001 ubuy in51 price, and the formula used to
derive said price. The trial court considered the evidence before it and determined what the
parties intended the wCbuy in" price to be and the formula used to arrive at such price. The
court then determined the weight to give such evidence. The court intended to insert the
price and formula stated in the Decision, and said as much in its Memorandum Decision.
Therefore, the trial court made no clerical error subject to amendment under Rule 60(a).
On appeal, this court should find that all PAJ's contentions fail as a matter of law, and
also fail as a matter of fact due to PAJ's failure to satisfy the marshaling requirement. This
court should specifically find that the findings of fact contained in the trial court's decisions
are sufficient as a matter of law, that the trial court treated PAJ's goodwill properly in its fair
value determination, and that the Decision did not contain a clerical error needing revision.
All PAJ's claims and requests on appeal should be denied.
B.

Appellee's Cross-Appeal
Compared to other business forms, a closely held corporation (UCHC") subjects

minority shareholders to distinct challenges in protecting their investment. Because a CHC
shareholder does not have a partner's power to dissolve the enterprise to get out, and
similarly does not have the exit option of selling shares in a securities market, a minority
shareholder in a CHC can become subject to the UCHC trap." Without a market remedy,
CHC shareholders are easily subjected to freeze-outs, squeeze-outs, and other forms of
oppression. Minority shareholders who disagree with the direction or governance of the
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CHC are easy targets for oppressive behavior and must rely only on contractual or statutory
remedies which are often inadequate.
Peterson was not only an owner, employee, and shareholder of PAJ, he was also a
founder of PAJ. Peterson, more than twenty years ago, at considerable risk and effort
founded this accounting firm, and it has grown exponentially since that time. PAJ has been
Peterson's livelihood and he has put countless hours and immeasurable effort into
maintaining PAJ's goodwill, reputation, and continued business successes. Peterson's name
was and still is forefront as the identity and reputation of the firm. Unfortunately, in 2006
conflicts arose among the shareholders of PAJ and, unfortunately for Peterson, he was the
odd man out in the three shareholder corporation. Peterson became the minority shareholder
caught in the CHC trap, with no desirable means of escape.
The Remaining Shareholders, who comprised a majority, engaged in oppressive and
selective conduct in an effort to force Peterson to leave PAJ and to cause Peterson
professional damage, impair his ability to work, and destroy his investment expectation. The
business relationship between the shareholders deteriorated quickly and was irreparable.
Peterson had no way out and was forced to take the drastic statutory remedy of seeking
judicial dissolution.
Rather than dissolve PAJ, the Remaining Shareholders elected, pursuant to Utah
statute, to purchase Peterson's shares. This decision alone evidences that PAJ had significant
value and goodwill as a going concern. The statute authorizing an election to purchase in lieu
of dissolution requires the electors to pay the "fair value" of the petitioning shareholder's
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shares in the corporation. However, this remedy is inadequate if the petitioning shareholder,
is not awarded the fair value of his shares. The trial court in this case did not award the true
fair value of Peterson's shares because, contrary to the reasoning of the Townsend Report,
the court failed to award the obvious value of undistributed and separately indentified excess
cash on hand as of the valuation date. Because the court thought speculation was necessary
to give the undistributed cash a value, it opted to value PAJ without regard to the separately
indentified $128,116.00 in undistributed cash as of the valuation date.
This was in error and violative of the election to purchase in lieu of dissolution statute,
because Peterson was not awarded the true fair value of his shares. The value of cash is
indisputable. Cash is the very measure of the fair value of Peterson's shares. Because
Townsend had already valued Peterson's shares excluding the $128,196.00 undistributed
cash reserves as of the valuation date, Peterson's share of that cash was obviously 36.37% or
$46,625.00. Peterson was entitled to his 36.37 percent of PAJ's undistributed cash, and this
court should adjust the Judgment by adding that amount, plus interest.
The trial court correctly determined Peterson is entitled to prejudgment interest from
December 31,2006, the valuation date. No agreements between the parties establish a rate of
interest to be paid should a buyout of a shareholder's shares take place. But, the trial court
erred in failing to apply the statutory prejudgment interest rate often percent, and instead
arbitrarily applied reduced rates.
As mentioned, without a market remedy minority CHC shareholders are easily
subjected to oppressive and selective behavior by majority CHC members. Recognizing the
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CHC minority shareholder's vulnerability, the Supreme Court of Utah recently articulated
broad fiduciary duties on CHC shareholders to give shareholders caught in the CHC trap
adequate remedies and protections when subjected to oppressive and selective behavior.
These fiduciary duties include a duty to observe the utmost good faith towards coshareholders in all dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the corporation's
business.
The Remaining Shareholders failed to honor their fiduciary duties and engaged in
behavior oppressive to Peterson's reasonable investment expectations. The Remaining
Shareholders' oppressive violations included, among other things, denial of entitled access to
corporate records and information, changing of computer passwords, termination of
Peterson's employment, termination of Peterson's management role, changing of locks to
deny Peterson access to his office and personal effects located therein, termination of
employees key to Peterson's employment functions, propagandizing other employees and
clients to side with the Remaining Shareholders, damaging and disparaging Peterson's
business and professional reputation, withholding funds due and entitled to Peterson, and
other forms of misapplication and waste of PAJ assets. This behavior is wrongful, cold, and
indeed oppressive, and would justify dissolution had the Remaining Shareholders not
determined to purchase Peterson's shares in lieu of dissolution. Thus, Peterson is entitled to
an award of attorneys' fees and costs.
Accordingly, this court should find that the trial court erred by omitting PAJ's excess
cash from its fair value determination of Peterson's shares, erred by significantly reducing the
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amount of prejudgment interest to which Peterson is entitled, and erred by failing to
determine that PAJ and the Remaining Shareholders engaged in oppressive or wasteful
conduct.
ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT IN RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
I.

THE BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IS PRIMARILY AN APPEAL OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S WEIGHING OF THE EVIDENCE; THUS, PAJ HAD A DUTY TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE, WHICH PAJ FAILED TO DO
Despite stipulating in a pretrial order (R. at 572) to the authentication of all exhibits on

the Master Exhibit List (R. at 560-568)9 and despite the fact all such exhibits were admitted
and received by the trial court (R. at 578-591), PAJ argues throughout its Brief of Appellants
not only that the findings of fact were insufficient, but also that the trial court inappropriately
gave weight to certain pieces of evidence while disregarding other pieces of evidence. As
argued in this brief, the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient as a matter of law. If PAJ
wants to challenge the trial court's decision as a matter of fact, marshaling is required. PAJ
made no attempt and wholly failed in its obligation to marshal any issues of fact raised in its
brief
In describing the respective roles of the trial court and appellate courts the Utah
Supreme Court stated as follows:
Evaluating conflicting testimony is the proper role of the finder of fact. When
an appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the lower
court's findings of fact, uC[an appellate court does] not weigh the evidence de
novo." In re Estate ofBartell, 776P.2d885, 886 (Utah 1989). Rather, [the
appellate court] accords great deference to the lower court's findings,
"especially when they are based on an evaluation of conflicting live
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testimony." Id. at 886. Moreover, c"to mount a successful challenge to the
correctness of atrial court's findings of fact, [the] appellant must first marshal
all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence
is legally insufficient to support the findings even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below.'" Aha Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846P.2d 1282, 1284
(Utah 1993) {quoting Reid v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah
1989)).
Hogle v. Zinetics Med, Inc., 2002 UT 121, f 16, 63 P.3d 80 (emphasis added).
In short, once evidence is admitted, even if conflicting, the trial court must go through a
process of weighing the evidence. The trial court's evidence weighing process is accorded
great deference by appellate courts. Once an appellant questions how much weight should be
given to certain evidence, it is outside the scope of appeal, unless and until the appellant
challenges the findings by marshaling all evidence supporting the trial court's findings. The
marshaling requirement cannot be circumvented under the guise of challenging the
sufficiency of the findings.
The authenticity of much of the evidence in the case at hand was stipulated to in a
pretrial order. (R. at 572). This same evidence was itself scrutinized, dissected, analyzed,
and reviewed over three days of trial. All documentary evidence offered was admitted and
received by the trial court, and objections to the sufficiency of the admissibility of the
evidence thereto were waived. (R. at 578-591). It was the judge's duty and prerogative to
give appropriate consideration to that evidence. After weighing the evidence, the trial court
determined that Peterson's expert's valuation (the "Townsend Valuation") was more credible
than PAJ's expert's (the "Bowles Valuation") valuation. (R. at 616-620). Such weighing
and decision making was properly done by the trial court because it was intimately involved
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in the litigation process, and this court should accord "great deference" to any trial court
findings, ''especially [because they were] based on an evaluation of conflicting live
testimony." Hogle, 2002 UT 121 at^fl6.
Importantly, the Townsend Valuation was admitted into evidence, as was the Bowles
Valuation. (R. at 583). Both parties, as well as the court, were given extensive opportunity
during three days of trial to challenge, bolster, evaluate, object to, and argue the strengths and
weaknesses of both valuations. Ultimately, the trial court considered both valuations and
expressly found the Townsend Report more accurately reflected the fair value of Peterson's
interest in the accounting firm. (R. at 616-20). This finding was sufficient as a matter of law
to support the trial court's judgment.
If on appeal PAJ wishes to delve into the weight or sufficiency of the evidence the
trial court relied upon in making its judgment, such as the comparability of the Townsend
Valuation market sample (Brief of Appellants at 12-20), the application of R-squared (Brief
of Appellants at 13-20), the amount of goodwill included in the fair value of PAJ (Brief of
Appellants at 20-24), and the financial agreements allowing Jackson to join the accounting
firm (Brief of Appellants at 24-28), PAJ should marshal the evidence, because PAJ is arguing
the weight of the evidence. Appellants should not be allowed to sidestep the marshaling
requirement by cloaking its factual and evidence-weighing challenges under the guise of
"insufficient findings."
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II.

PAJ DID NOT PRESERVE THE ISSUE OF SUFFICIENCY OF FINDINGS OF
FACT FOR APPEAL
Peterson asserts that the trial court's findings are, as a matter of law, sufficient to

justify the judgment. Nevertheless, PAJ failed to preserve the issue of the sufficiency of
detail of the findings for appeal. In 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., the Utah Supreme
Court stated "[i]n order to preserve an issue for appeal[,] the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 2004 UT
72,151, 99 P.3d 801 (citingBrookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ^14,
48 P.3d 968 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co. 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1988))).
In 438 Main Street, plaintiff challenged the sufficiency of a trial court judge's findings
of fact, contending they are legally insufficient because they fail to adequately disclose the
steps by which he reached his ultimate conclusion on factual issues. 2004 UT 72, ^[51.
Plaintiff argued that it raised objections to the sufficiency of the findings in both objections
to district court's findings of fact as well as at a hearing. Id. at ^52. However, the court
determined that plaintiffs assertions that the findings were "inaccurate" and "incomplete"
does not indicate that the findings themselves were insufficiently detailed to disclose how the
court reached its decision. Id. at ^53. Further, the court ruled that simply asserting that
findings or conclusions are incorrect or unsupported by the evidence is equally inadequate.
Id. at TJ54. The court noted, u[i]t is one thing for a party to say that the judge's findings are
erroneous because they are contrary to or unsupported by the evidence, and quite another to
say that the findings are insufficiently detailed." Id. Because plaintiff only articulated the
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findings were erroneous or incomplete, not that they were insufficiently detailed, plaintiffs
objection did not preserve the sufficiency argument for appeal. Id.
Like the plaintiff in 438 Main Street, PAJ now attempts to challenge the sufficiency of
the trial court's findings of fact. Brief of Appellants at 10-20. Also akin to the 438 Main
Street plaintiff, PAJ failed to adequately preserve this issue for appeal. It is conceded that
PAJ did file a Motion for Amendment of Findings and supporting memoranda and did, in
fact, state in one sentence that the findings were insufficiently detailed to address the issues
pled at trial. (R. at 695). However, the motion and supporting memoranda "failed to
specifically raise its objections and to introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal
authority that the findings themselves were insufficiently detailed." 438 Main Street, 2004
UT 72 at TJ56. Further, these documents never asserted that the trial court's findings were
legally insufficient because they fail to adequately disclose the steps by which the trial court
reached its ultimate conclusion on factual issues. (R. at 688-697, 875-892). Rather, the
documents argued that the findings were erroneous and incomplete. Id. In PAJ's reply
memorandum all that is requested is "additional findings" because the findings in the
Judgment were "incomplete." (R. at 885-890). In other words, PAJ sought "additional" not
"necessary" findings.
As seen in 438 Main Street, incomplete and erroneous findings are not the same as
insufficient findings. PAJ's post-trial pleadings focused on claims of erroneous and/or
incomplete findings. However, the Judgment and Second Judgment stated that the trial court
found the Townsend Valuation to be credible, and relied on the Townsend Valuation in
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determining the fair value of PAJ to be $459,000.00.

Therefore, because only the

completeness and accuracy of the findings were challenged, and not the "sufficiency" or
"necessity" of the findings, PAJ did not preserve the issue of the sufficiency of the findings
for appeal.
III.

EVEN IF PAJ DID PRESERVE THE "SUFFICIENCY" ARGUMENT FOR
APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE SUFFICIENT
AS A MATTER OF LAW
The trial court made sufficient findings in its Decision (R. at 613-626, Brief of

Appellants Exhibit D), Judgment (R. at 675-678, Brief of Appellants Exhibit C),
Memorandum Decision (R. at 910-22, Brief of Appellants Exhibit B), and Second Judgment
(R. at 977-81, Brief of Appellants Exhibit A) regarding the ultimate facts of this case.
Further, the trial court's findings show the trial court's judgment follows logically from and
is supported by the evidence and included enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in relevant part: "the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon,... [i]t will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally ... or appear in an
opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court." See also Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d
847 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (wCIn assessing the sufficiency of the findings, however, we are not
confined to the contents of a particular document entitled 'Findings'... Viewing the findings
from the various sources in the record, there appears to be ample factual support for the
conclusions reached by the trial court").
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To withstand appellate review, "[t]he [trial court's] findings of fact must show that the
court's judgment or decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The
findings should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Jensen v. Jensen,
2009 UT App 1,1J8, 203 P.3d 1020 {citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah
1988)). The Court is only required to make findings on the material issues; it is not necessary
to resolve all conflicting evidentiary issues. In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); see also Jankele v. Texas Co., 54 P.2d 425, 428, 88 Utah 325 (Utah
1936) (The findings of a trial court sitting without a jury should be limited to ultimate facts).
Nor is it required that the court negate allegations in its findings of fact. Sorenson v. Beers,
614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980). Even findings that are "conclusory in nature" are sufficient
to satisfy the "sufficiency" requirement for findings of fact. Id. Finally, by reference to
reports or other evidence, the trial court can incorporate such evidence into its findings which
should be considered in determining the findings' sufficiency. Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT App
41,1JH8, 10, 974 P.2d 306; see also Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,^11, 176
P.3d 476 (quotingErwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)) ("[i]n assessing
the sufficiency of the findings . . . we are not confined to the contents of a particular
document entitled 'Findings'; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the bench or
contained in other documents . . .").
In this case the ultimate factual issue the trial court was asked to determine was the
fair value of Plaintiff s shares in PAJ pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(4). That
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statute provides that the court shall "determine the fair value of the petitioning shareholder's
shares as of the ... date the court determines to be appropriate under the circumstances and
based on the factors the court determines to be appropriate." See Hogle, 2002 UT 121 at \\0,
{quoting Swope v. Siegel-Roberts, Inc., 243 F.3d 486, 491 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 534 U.S.
887, 151L.Ed2dl39, 122S.Q. 198 (2001)) ("the ultimate determination of fair value is a
question of fact..."). This standard allows considerable discretion in weighing the factors
which a court deems appropriate in making a "fair value" determination. There is no "fair
value" definition included in Section 1434, nor does said section fix a method to be used in
valuing shares. In contrast, this is extremely dissimilar to alimony determinations, such as
those cited in the Brief of Appellants, where certain statutory factors must be considered,
determined, and arguably contained in the findings by the court. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(a) (list of factors court must consider in determining alimony).
Although the statute does not provide much guidance in determining the fair value of
shares, Utah case law has provided some guidance. Utah courts permit "all generally
accepted techniques of valuation used in the financial community." Bingham Consolidation
Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, ^[18, 105 P.3d 365 {quoting Paskill Corp v. Alcoma
Corp., 747 A.2d 549 (Del. 2000)). Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the
three most recognized and relevant elements of fair value for stock valuation purposes are
asset value, market value, and investment value." Hogle, 2002 UT 121, TJ18; see

a

^o

Oakridge Energy v. Clifton, 937 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1997). The Utah Supreme Court has
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also stated that the asset approach is the least reliable of the three factors in value
determination unless the corporation is being liquidated. Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, ^[19.
In its Decision, the trial court made the following findings relevant to fair value: that
it was the court's calling to determine the fair value of Peterson's 36.37% in PAJ; that this
was to be done as of the valuation date of December 31, 2006; that there is no definitive
procedure for valuing a business ; that experts offer different opinions regarding determined
value; that the Bowles Report recommended the fair value of Peterson's shares was
$224,639.00 based on an asset based approach; that the asset based approach is the "least
reliable of the valuation methods", in cases such as this, where the corporation is not being
liquidated; that Bowles misinterpreted Utah case law; that the Bowles Report should be
disregarded since it was based solely on the asset-based approach; that the Townsend Report
considered all three valuation techniques approved and suggested by Utah case law; that
Towns€nd applied a percentage weight of each value and offered a reasonable and educated
explanation of why he did so; that Townsend's valuation "used widely accepted principles of
financial analysis and valuation"; that Townsend's valuation was $459,000.00; and that the
trial court found the fair value of Peterson's shares in PAJ to be $459,000.00 based on the
evidence presented and its resulting credibility given to the Townsend Report. (R. at 616620, 625); see also Judgment (R. at 675) and Second Judgment (R. at 977) (incorporating
Decision and its findings by reference); see also Memorandum Decision (R. at 910-916)
(making additional and supplemental findings).
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Clearly, said findings are sufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion of value was reached, and to allow this reviewing court the means to
adequately determine that the trial court's decision was rationally based.
Again, Utah law does not require findings of fact to resolve all conflicting evidentiary
issues, to address all issues raised at trial, or negate any or all allegations. Therefore, the trial
court was not as a matter of law required to make specific findings justifying the applicability
of Townsend's market approach, as to the comparability of the companies used in
Townsend's market approach to PAJ, or as to the application of .92, as alleged by PAJ in its
Brief of Appellants.
Despite not being required or obligated to make additional findings, the trial court, in
its Memorandum Decision, reiterated and bolstered its findings of its earlier Decision.
Included in these supplemental findings was a reiteration that the ultimate decision to be
made by the trial court was to determine the fair value of PAJ. (R. at 914). The court found
the fair value to be $459,000.00 after considering both parties' experts and determining the
Townsend Report was more credible and convincing because "he used 'widely accepted
principles of financial analysis ... [and] addressed the three most recognized valuation
methods that the Supreme Court of Utah has relied on ... [rather than] only the asset based
approach." (R. at 619, 914).
The trial court then bolstered the findings of the Decision by making "additional", not
"necessary", findings. In the Memorandum Decision the trial court made "additional findings
to ensure its Decision is sufficiently detailed to disclose the step on which the ultimate
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conclusion was reached." (R. at 914). The additional findings specifically address the issues
which PAJ now asserts lack sufficiency (i.e., Townsend's market comparables and goodwill).
First, the Memorandum Decision makes a finding as to the comparability of Townsend's
market analysis data as follows:
Townsend's market analysis data was comparable to and appropriately
considered in the valuation of PAJ, as shown by a high correlation to PAJ of
0.92 . . . Townsend testified that such a high correlation was rare and therefore
determined the market approach to be very appealing in determining value for
this particular company.
(R. at 915).
The aforementioned finding is "sufficient" regarding the comparability of Townsend's
market sample. The trial court expressly found "Townsend's market analysis data was
comparable to and appropriately considered in the valuation of PAJ, as shown by a high
correlation of PAJ of 0.92." Id. (emphasis added.) Further explanation is not needed. See
Sorenson, 614 P.2d at 160 (even findings that are "conclusory in nature" are sufficient to
satisfy the "sufficiency" requirement for findings of fact).
The trial court judge acknowledged he is not a valuation expert, and that he relied on
Townsend's testimony to make said finding.

(R. at 914).

Townsend selected the

comparables and he talked about the comparables at length in his trial testimony. (T. Vol. I
at 84-85, Vol. II at 247-259). The trial court's finding accurately reflects Townsend's
testimony and serves as a basis to explain why the judge found merit in Townsend's market
approach and the comparables used by Townsend.

If PAJ wished to challenge the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting said finding, it had an obligation to marshal the
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evidence. PAJ may not simply make bald and unfounded assertions that the court did not
understand the statistics behind the experts' opinions to circumvent the marshaling
requirement.
Further, PAJ cannot simply argue that Townsend's comparables are more different
than alike, or as put by PAJ, like comparing pigs and cows (as opposed to brown cows and
dark brown cows), without marshaling such a factual determination. See Hogle, 2002 UT
121, ^[26 (stating the determination of whether "subjects of comparison are more different
than alike" is a factual determination).

The trial court's decision as to Townsend's

comparables, ultimately, is just a factor of weighing the evidence, thus, entitling the trial
court to exercise broad discretion. PAJ made no attempt to marshal the evidence regarding
this finding, and therefore, this court must defer and give broad deference to the trial court's
finding. The Election to Purchase in Lieu of Dissolution Statute does not require an exact
value, but only requires a "fair value". If the statute required an exact value, PAJ would have
had to been sold. However, PAJ (and the Remaining Shareholders) chose to buyout Peterson
and litigate PAJ's fair value. There is no exact formula to obtain such fair value. The court
was entitled to rely upon expert's opinions; and, as stated clearly in the findings, the trial
court decided to rely on Townsend's opinion.
Second, the Memorandum Decision makes a finding on goodwill by stating as
follows:
Townsend's exclusion of any personal goodwill deduction was appropriate
where that expert gave considerable weight to Plaintiffs employment contract,
and opined that such constructively affixed any of Plaintiff s personal goodwill
with PAJ as an enterprise. (See Trial Testimony, Feb. 18, 2009 [T. Vol. I]).
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As Townsend testified, where personal goodwill has become transferable, it is
no longer personal. (See Trial Testimony, Feb. 18, 2009 [T. Vol. I]). Further,
how Bowles extrapolated personal goodwill in his calculations was in error
and excluded the benefit of the bargain.
(R. at 915).
The aforementioned finding is also sufficient regarding goodwill. The finding is
sufficiently detailed and includes enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion of fair value was reached. The judge relied on Townsend's Report and
approved of Townsend's treatment of goodwill, and the information contained in
Townsend's Report regarding goodwill is incorporated by reference into the trial court's
findings. More is not required as this is not an ultimate conclusion and the trial court's
findings showed it had made a rationally based decision.
PAJ cannot challenge these, or any other requested findings, as a matter of law. The
trial court heard three days of testimony and considered volumes of evidence in making its
ultimate determinations. The trial court is not required to make a finding based on every
piece of evidence considered and is not required to negate every allegation regarding the
evidence.

It is only required that sufficient findings are made to show the trial court's

ultimate decision was rationally based.
For PAJ to challenge the trial court's ultimate conclusion, PAJ must marshal the
evidence, rather than attempting to sidestep the marshaling requirement by arguing such
findings are legally insufficient. If PAJ were allowed to challenge the correctness of these
findings under the guise of insufficiency, the whole marshaling requirement will be rendered
a nullity. The trial court's Decision, Judgment, Memorandum Decision, Second Judgment,
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and incorporations by reference made therein, have more than sufficiently addressed the
ultimate issues to be determined in a fair value determination under the statute and pursuant
to the relevant case law. The trial court's findings are sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion, the fair value
of PAJ, was reached. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court's findings were sufficient.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED, ALLOCATED, AND
MADE FINDINGS REGARDING GOODWILL, BOTH ENTERPRISE AND
PERSONAL, IN REACHING ITS CONCLUSION AS TO THE FAIR VALUE
OF PAJ SHARES
As argued above, the trial court properly considered and allocated goodwill when

determining the fair value of PAJ by relying on Townsend's Report and making findings
thereon. The choice of valuation methodology in assessing property is a question of fact. Salt
Lake City S R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm% 1999 UT 90, ^[13, 987 P.2d 594. The resulting
determination of fair value is also a question of fact. Id. As mentioned above, in Section III,
the court made explicit findings regarding goodwill, including personal goodwill, and
therefore, goodwill was considered by the trial court in its determination of fair value.
However, PAJ failed to marshal the evidence regarding the trial court's goodwill allocation.
This court should grant broad deference to the trial court's allocation of personal and
enterprise goodwill.
PAJ asserts in its Brief of Appellants that the specific allocation of personal goodwill
when determining fair value in either a dissenting shareholder action or an election to
purchase action is a case of first impression in Utah. Brief of Appellants at 20. So PAJ
suggests that the court should follow rulings in divorce case property allocation. However,
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PAJ's reliance on the case of Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, and other divorce cases1, for
guidance in personal goodwill allocation is misguided. In divorce cases the court's goals are
different. The object in divorce is to make an overall equitable property division, rather than
simply determining the fair value of an entity. Also, in divorce cases, courts often consider
both goodwill and alimony, so as to avoid the ''double counting" that would occur if one of
the parties would recover the value of goodwill initially and recover from the party's future
income in the form of alimony. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11 at ^[42.
Stonehocker, in relevant part, involved the property division (as opposed to simply the
valuation) of the husband's proprietary used car dealership in a divorce proceeding. Id. at ^5.
This car dealership was husband's primary source of income. Id. The issue was whether the
valuation of the dealership for property division and support calculation purposes should
include any goodwill. Id. The court determined that the dealership should be valued
independent of any goodwill for the following reasons: because "[the dealership] is the
product of Husband's reputation, goodwill, and sole efforts" and, thus, ''essentially [a] sole
proprietorship", because "[t]here can be no goodwill in a business that is dependant on its
existence upon the individual who conducts the enterprise and would vanish were the
individual to die, retire or quit work," and because the wife did not have an active role in the
dealership's operations. Id. at ^40-44.

1 Peterson was unable to locate the quoted passages from PAJ's citation in its Brief of
Appellants, pages 20-21, to Prince v. Unsecured Creditors Committee, 117 S.Ct. 608
(1996). Peterson found said citation, however, the writ of certiorari for this case was
denied and no opinion, aside from the denial of cert., was given. Therefore, Peterson is
unable to respond, rebut, or analyze said quotations, as they do not appear to exist.
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If divorce cases are relevant in determining whether goodwill should be included in
PAJ's fair value, PAJ is much more comparable to the twenty-three member medical
professional clinic in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1079-1080 (Utah 1988). In
Gardner it was determined goodwill could have been included in the clinic's valuation
because the members had banded together in a business organization, the clinic is not likely
to be highly susceptible to earnings interruptions because of the ill health or absence of a
single member, and the business will be able to generate income from its continued
patronage. Id.
Unlike the used car dealership in Stonehocker, PAJ is not a sole proprietorship
equivalent, dependent on one member's contributions for its existence. It is an established
multi-member professional practice with a long solid business reputation in the community.
The firm has extensive goodwill separate and apart from any one practitioner. This is
evidenced by the fact PAJ chose to buy Peterson out, in lieu of dissolution, and has engaged
in this extensive and costly litigation trying to maintain PAJ rather than "closing shop" and
forming a different practice apart from PAJ. See T. Vol. II at 252. PAJ has proven it is not
dependent on any one member for its existence by squeezing Peterson out of the firm. After
Peterson's departure the business continued under the name "Peterson Allred Jackson" (R. at
571, stipulated fact number 13). If personal goodwill were relevant, as PAJ suggests, why did
not Allred and Jackson simply start a new business rather than elect to purchase Peterson's
shares and continue under his name? Instead it is evident that goodwill had been
institutionalized in the business. It is evident that PAJ has goodwill (including value in the
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workforce in place, the training processes, the exiting procedures, the phone number, the
location, the client relationships, the institutionalized identity, etc.) that should be included in
the calculation of its fair value. See T. Vol. I at 93-100, Vol. II. at 252.
PAJ also argues that "personal goodwill" should not be included in the fair value of
PAJ. However, the trial court, in relying on the Townsend Report, did not include any
"personal goodwill" in its valuation of PAJ. First, as acknowledged by PAJ in its Brief of
Appellants on pages 21-22, Peterson, Allred, and Jackson all entered into Employment
Agreements which contained a non-competition agreement prohibiting them from soliciting
or providing any professional services to any of PAJ's clients for a period of two years. Trial
Exhibits 46, 53, and 54. Indeed, PAJ enforced such provisions against Petersen (T. Vol. II at
357-59). The court explicitly found that the aforementioned Employment Agreements
converted personal goodwill, if any, to enterprise goodwill. (R. at 915). Removing Allred5s
and Jackson's speculative "personal goodwill" from the valuation of PAJ would not only
disregard the Employment Agreements, but would also exclude Peterson from getting the
benefit of his bargain. T. Vol. I at 99-100. Second, Townsend's Report, as accepted by the
trial court, adjusted the reasonable fair market salary for each of the PAJ shareholders from
the final valuation, thus, compensating each owner for any personal goodwill before
valuation. See, generally, Trial Exhibit 90; see Trial Exhibit 90, Sch. E.; see also (R. at 915).
Therefore, and contrary to PAJ's assertion, the trial court did not include personal
goodwill in the fair value of PAJ and, as a result, the remaining PAJ shareholders were not
forced to purchase their own goodwill. Townsend's Report, which was accepted by the trial
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court, subtracted personal goodwill of shareholders (through the deduction of a fair market
salary) before coming to a final valuation. To the extent any personal goodwill was
remaining, it was converted to enterprise goodwill through the Employment Agreements
bargained for and entered into by the shareholders. Further, the trial court made a finding
regarding the inclusion or exclusion of personal goodwill in the fair value (R. at 915). If PAJ
wished to challenge that finding it needed to marshal the evidence in support of said finding,
which PAJ failed to do. Thus, the trial court's findings regarding goodwill were sufficient
and the trial court's reliance on the Townsend Report and the Townsend Report's treatment
of goodwill was proper as a matter of law.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE BEFORE IT
WHEN CONSIDERING THE FORMULA USED TO CALCULATE
JACKSON'S 2001 "BUY-IN" PURCHASE PRICE, THE BUY-IN MULTIPLE,
AND THE WEIGHT TO GIVE IT IN DETERMINING THE FAIR VALUE OF
PAJ
PAJ miscontrues Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) in alleging that the trial court

made a "mathematical error" in determining Jackson's "buy-in" price and formula used to
arrive at said "buy-in" price and request that a correction be made. Such correction is not
necessary or even permissible by the trial court; first, because rule 60(a) does not contemplate
corrections in circumstances such as this, second, because the trial court's conideration of the
formula used to calculate Jackson's "buy-in" price was supported by the evidence, and, third,
the valuation of the "buy-in" price was irrelevant to the court's ultimate conclusions.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note, Jackson did not "buy-in" to what was
then known as Peterson Allred, but rather merged Jackson Downs with Peterson Allred,
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which formed PAJ. T. Vol. I at 14-16. In addition to the "buy-in" purchase price, PAJ
acquired by merger Jackson Downs, and all its business, clients, accounts, accounts
receivable, employees, etc. Id.
The trial court's interpretation of the parties' formula used to calculate Jackson's buyin purchase price was not a "clerical error" subject to revision by the trial court. Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(a) allows correction of only "clerical mistakes in judgments". The case
of Richards v. Siddoway, All P.2d 143, 144-45 (Utah 1970) distinguishes between clerical
mistakes and judicial errors, and advises as follows:
[Ujnder ... the Rules of Civil Procedure, one wishing to amend a judgment
valid upon its face must move to do so within three months except for
correction of clerical errors. . .
After expiration of the term at which it was rendered, or of the statutory period
of limitation, in cases governed by statute, a judgment is no longer open to any
amendment, revision, modification, or correction which involves the exercise
of the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or on matters of
substance. The only amendment then permissible is one which is intended to
make the judgment speak the truth by showing what the judicial action really
was, and not one which corrects judicial errors or remedies the effects of
judicial nonaction; the court has no power at such time to revise and amend a
judgment by correcting judicial errors, and making it express something which
the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the first
instance. Judicial errors in judgments are to be corrected by appeal... and not
by amendment...
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does not depend
upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made in rendering the
judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered.
(emphasis added); see also Stranger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201,1206 (Utah
1983) (clerical mistakes are corrected in the interest of having the judgment reflect what was
intended).
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In the case before us, there was no Rule 60(a) "clerical error" involved. The trial
court heard testimony on the formula used, had evidence of the allegations that present value
should be accounted for in determining the "buy-in" price, weighed the evidence before it,
and made a decision as to these matters. Trial Exhibit 83; T. Vol. Ill at 367-73 The trial
court intended to make the findings it made based on the evidence. (R. at 618-19, 913-14,
917-918). The court explicitly stated, "The Court will not now change those intentions",
when referring to its treatment of the "buy in" amount. (R. at 918). The trial court cannot
now revise the judgment pursuant to rule 60(a) and make the judgment express something the
trial court did not initially pronounce or intend to pronounce. Richards, 471 P.2d at 144-45. If
PAJ wished to challenge the finding as made by the trial court, it was required to challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding by marshaling the evidence; which PAJ
failed to do.
Further, the finding made as to the value of PAJ and the formula used to calculate
Jackson's "buy-in" purchase price was supported by the evidence. T. Vol. Ill at 367-373;
Trial Exhibit 83. Peterson testified that it was agreed that the value of the merged firm of PAJ
was ninety percent of $750,000.00, (i.e. $675,000.00), as of January 1, 2002. T. Vol. Ill at
372-373; Trial Exhibit 83. The evidence further supported a conclusion that to acquire 15.83
percent of PAJ would cost Jackson $106,850.00. T. Vol. Ill at 371; Trial Exhibit 83. All
aforementioned evidence was admitted, entitling the trial court to rely on it and to give it
appropriate weight. (R. at 583).

Finally, even if PAJ had a basis to appeal this finding, and

even if it had marshaled the evidence, this finding is inconsequential as to the ultimate
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conclusion of the case. If this case was remanded to the trial court for "corrected" findings on
this issue as suggested by PAJ, the trial court's "corrected" findings would be moot and
inconsequential. (R. at 618-19, 913-14, 917-918). The "corrected" findings would not
change the trial court's ultimate conclusion as to the fair value of PAJ because the trial court
expressly stated it did not rely upon such to make its fair value determination. Id. Similarly,
Townsend's Report did not place any weight on Jackson's buy-in purchase price in his
valuation of PAJ. Trial Exhibit 90 at 19. (Ironically, had the trial court relied on that formula,
Peterson would have received more for his shares.) In response to PAJ's motion to amend
this finding, the trial court concluded:
Defendants are merely attempting to persuade this Court to reconsider the
weight it attributed to the 2001 buy-in. Regardless of how Defendants couch
their argument, this the Court cannot and will not do. . . Defendants, at trial,
argued that Townsend's calculations needed to be adjusted for present value,
Plaintiff argued they did not. The Court found Plaintiff and Plaintiffs expert
more credible. Further, it was not the "number" reached by the 2001 buy-in
formula that influenced the Court as Defendant tries to argue. It was the
simple formula itself and the parties' seeming reliance on the 90 percent of
revenue in the buy-sell agreements. {See Ex. 70, Ex. 83, and Trial Testimony,
Feb. 19-20, 2009. [T. Vol. II and III.]) Therefore, the Court does not feel it
necessary to amend any "findings" with regard to the 2001 buy-in formula,
especially since the Court ultimately did not rely upon it when determining the
fair value of the Plaintiffs shares.
(R. at 914) (emphasis added).
The trial court also explicitly specified: "[t]he Court did not use [the Jackson buy-in
formula] to choose the value in the middle or to justify Plaintiffs 'number'". (R. at 913).
Remanding this to the trial court for additional or corrected findings on this issue would be
inappropriate and immaterial.
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Therefore, because this finding was not the result of a clerical error, rule 60(a) does
not provide the trial court a basis to change, modify or amend this finding. Further, because
PAJ failed to marshal the evidence in support of this finding this Court must defer to and
afford broad deference to the trial court's findings. Finally, because no reliance was placed
upon this finding by the trial court in the trial court's determination of the fair value of PAJ,
is moot and a waste of judicial resources to remand this case to the trial court for further
findings on this issue.
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD PETERSON HIS
36.37 PERCENT SHARE OF THE $128,196.00 EXCESS CASH PAJ HAD ON
HAND AS OF THE DECEMBER 31, 2006 VALUATION DATE.
Because the determination of the fair value of Peterson's shares in PAJ requires

consideration of any cash PAJ had on hand as of the valuation date, the trial court erred by
allowing PAJ to retain Peterson's 36.37 percent share of the excess and undistributed cash
PAJ had on hand as of the date Peterson's shares were valued. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a1434(1) provides that in a dissolution proceeding, the corporation or its shareholders may
elect to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder at the
"fair value" of the shares. If the parties cannot come to an agreement as to the fair value of
the shares, the court shall "determine the fair value of the petitioning shareholder's shares as
of the ... date the court determines to be appropriate under the circumstances and based on
the factors the court determines to be appropriate." Utah Code Ann. § 16- 10a-1434(4).
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For purposes of satisfying the marshaling requirement, to the extent it is necessary in
challenging the trial court's failure to award Peterson his 36.37 percent share of the excess
cash PAJ had on hand as of the valuation date, Peterson presents the following summary of
facts, all of which were undisputed evidence introduced at trial.
First, PAJ, in 2006, retained a larger than normal cash balance equal to $138,442.00 or
$ 139,071.47 (depending on whether looking at Trial Exhibit 90, Attachment 4, Schedule I or
Trial Exhibit 93) in the business rather than distributing cash generated by earnings to the
owners throughout the year. To this, Townsend testified PAJ retained $ 13 8,442.00 in cash at
2006 year end. T. Vol. I at 89,102; and Trial Exhibit 90, attachment 4, Schedule I. However,
based on historical average, PAJ typically retained only approximately $10,000.00 cash
balance from one year to the next. Id. Therefore, there was $128,196.00 available for
shareholder distribution in the year in which Peterson was terminated. Id. Bowles also
testified that PAJ retained a larger than normal cash balance the year Peterson was
terminated. Specifically, Bowles testified that PAJ had "cash ... in the bank" at 2006 year
end of "approximately $136,000.00", and later acknowledged the amount to be $139,071.47.
T. Vol. II at 168-69, 192-198; and Trial Exhibit 93. Both Allred and Jackson also
acknowledged this accumulation of cash that existed at the end of 2006. See T. Vol. II at 303.
(Allred acknowledging cash accumulation); T. Vol. Ill at 414-17 (Jackson testifying about
year end cash accumulation); see also T. Vol. II at 168 (Bowles testifying of cash
accumulation and explaining expenses coming due in January.)
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Second, the evidence is undisputed that in years prior to 2006, specifically during the
years of 2002-2005, PAJ maintained a corporate policy of distributing excess cash to
shareholders throughout the year and at year end. See Trial Exhibit 90, Attachment 4,
Schedule I; and T. Vol. I at 89, 102. Bowles also testified to this fact stating PAJ "maxed
cash distributions" in 2002-2005. T. Vol. II at 197-98; Trial Exhibit 94.14. Further, Jackson
acknowledged that Peterson, Allred, and Jackson were all entitled to equal distributions of
excess cash at year end under the "original agreement,5' but in 2006 no distributions were
made because PAJ had obligations coming due in January 2007. T. Vol. Ill at 414-17; see
also T. Vol. II at 303-04 (Allred testifying about need for cash due to bills coming due in
January, 2007).
Third, the evidence is undisputed that Peterson and other owners of PAJ did not
receive a distribution of the 2006 year end cash balance (T. Vol. II at 303-304), and that
Allred and Jackson made the decision to refrain from making the distributions historically
made to PAJ owners after the conflict between them and Peterson started and Peterson's
termination was impending. Bowles testified that "Peterson leaving" and "management
structure of the firm changing]" was what lead to the firm keeping cash in 2006 where
historically they had not done so. T. Vol. II at 225. Jackson also, while denying it was done
to exclude Peterson from his share, acknowledged this change in management style. T. Vol.
II. at 234-239.
Fourth, both experts, in their respective testimony and valuations, acknowledged
Peterson was entitled to his 36.37 percent share of the cash that existed in PAJ on the
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valuation date. And, both credited Peterson with the same. When asked if the cash that
existed on the valuation date was included in his fair value calculation, Bowles testified
affirmatively and stated,wC [Peterson] gets his third of the cash or 36 percent of the cash that
existed at 12-31 [-06]." T. Vol. II at 229. Townsend likewise determined Peterson was
entitled to 36.37 percent of undistributed earnings as a separate component of fair value.
Trial Exhibit 90 at 3-4.
Finally, Townsend testified that his determination of the excess cash was also based
on the information provided to him by Jackson. T. Vol. I at 117. Jackson informed
Townsend that PAJ's year end liabilities were about $6,500. Id.
Because the aforementioned facts are undisputed, no questions of fact remain, but
rather a question of law remains as to whether Peterson is entitled to a 36.37% share of the
undistributed excess cash PAJ had in reserve as of the valuation date. The election to
purchase in lieu of dissolution statute clearly requests fair value to be determined as of the
valuation date. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(4). Therefore as a matter of law the fair
value determination cannot and should not take into account liabilities which do not become
due until after the valuation date. Townsend's report fairly reflected the value of PAJ after
considering PAJ's liabilities as of the December 31, 2006, valuation date. PAJ, and Jackson
himself, provided information to Townsend that as of the valuation date roughly $6,500.00
was PAJ's outstanding expenses that were due and payable. Arguably, any anticipated
expense coming due after the valuation cut off date would also be offset by accounts
receivable collected after that date. Therefore based on the amount of outstanding expenses
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and PAJ's historical practices of distributing year end cash, Townsend gave PAJ a generous
$10,000.00 credit against the cash to be distributed. The statute precludes the Court from
reducing the fair value, as of the valuation date, to account for liabilities that do nol come due
until after the valuation date. Therefore, the trial court erroneously failed to award Peterson
his 36.37 percent interest in PAJ's 2006 year end excess cash reserve.
In the case at hand, the trial court determined the valuation date to be December 31,
2006. (R. at 421, 614). The trial court solicited valuations from both Peterson and PAJ of
Peterson's 36.37 percent share of PAJ. (R. at 437). Because Peterson's expert (Townsend)
produced a valuation deemed more reliable, the trial court relied on Townsend's Report to
determine the value of Peterson's shares. (R. at 616-20). The trial court summarized
Townsend's valuation as follows:
[Peterson's] expert did offer a reasonable and educated explanation for making
the assumption he did. [Peterson's] expert witness asserts that the fair value of
[Peterson's] 36.37 % in PAJ, as of December 31, 2006, equals $459,000.00.
Further, [Peterson's] expert also states that [Peterson] was entitled to 36.37 %
of the $128,196.00 undistributed cash as of December 31, 2006, equaling
$46,625.00. Therefore, in total, [Peterson's] expert asserts [Peterson] is owed
$505,625.00.
(R. at 618) (emphasis added); see also Trial Exhibit 90, Attachment 4 at 27 (explaining how
Townsend arrived at the $128,196.00 excess and distributable cash figure by subtracting the
average cash retained by PAJ in 2002-2005 from the amount of cash retained by PAJ in
2006).
Despite relying on the Townsend Report, the trial court concluded that the value of
Peterson's shares in PAJ were only worth $459,000.00, not Townsend's total valuation of
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$505,625.00. (R. at 625). The trial court failed to determine what rights Peterson had in the
undistributed cash PAJ had on reserve as of December 31,2006, and refused to award any of
said reserves to Peterson. (R. at 619-620). This decision was in spite of the trial court's
concession that the Townsend Report "reduced cash in the adjusted balance sheet approach
so as to avoid double counting excess cash in its valuation report." (R. at 620). Thus, the
excess cash on reserve was not considered, valued, or included in Townsend's $459,000.00
valuation figure. Id.; Trial Exhibit 90 at 3-4, Trial Exhibit 90 Attachment 4 at 27-28. Rather,
Townsend segregated PAJ's undistributed cash reserve and determined that the fair value of
Peterson's shares entitled him to 36.37 percent of PAJ's undistributed cash reserve. Id.
Specifically, Townsend found that on December 31, 2006 PAJ had an undistributed cash
reserve of $128,196.00, and, of that amount, Peterson was entitled to 36.37 percent, or
$46,625.00. Id.

To reiterate, this amount was deemed by Townsend to be part of

Townsend's "fair value" calculation and Peterson was entitled to this amount in addition to
the $459,000.00 the trial court awarded as fair value of Peterson's shares.
To explain its decision to deny Peterson his 36.37 percent share of PAJ's cash reserve,
the trial court reasoned, "[ujnfortunately, the Court could not find nor determine what the
[Peterson's] expert's subsequent value would be had the excess cash been included and the
Court was not willing to speculate." (R. at 620). What the trial court failed to understand is
that speculation was unnecessary - the value of cash is not subject to debate; cash is the
fundamental standard of valuation. For example, if PAJ's assets were comprised solely of
cash, no experts would have been necessary to determine the value of Peterson's shares. The
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court could simply determine how much cash was in the company, then award Peterson 36.37
percent of the cash. This simple concept was applied by Townsend. Townsend determined
that as of the valuation date, PAJ had $128,196.00 cash on hand. Trial Exhibit 90 at 3-4,
Trial Exhibit 90 Attachment 4 at 27-28. He then applied Peterson's 36.37 percent ownership
interest to the reserve and concluded Peterson was entitled to $46,625.00 of the reserve. Id.
In recognizing that Townsend's $459,000.00 fair value figure did not include the
value of the undistributed cash, and in explaining that the court could not determine how the
PAJ reserves would affect Townsend's total valuation, the trial court failed to appreciate that
Townsend treated the PAJ excess cash as another ucomponent[] of value." Trial Exhibit 90
Attachment 4, Letter from Townsend to Plaintiffs counsel at 2 (stating gcthe fair value of a
36.37 percent ownership interest in Peterson Allred Jackson, P.C., excluding distributable
excess cash available to owners as of December 31,2006, is: $459,000. Four Hundred FiftyNine Thousand Dollars. 36.37 % of distributable excess cash in the amount of $46,625 as
discussed in the attached Rule 26b report is additive to this amount for a total of $505,625 for
both components of value") (emphasis added).
Townsend stated that Peterson's entitlement to his share of the excess cash wcis
additive to the value of Mr. Peterson's interest in PAJ since the value of these funds has not
been included in the valuation." Trial Exhibit 90 at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, although not
recognized by the trial court as such, Townsend did include the undistributed cash in his
valuation of PAJ, he simply segregated his valuation of PAJ into two separate components:
the excess cash component and everything else.

44

It is obviously a simple process of elimination. If the corporation is otherwise fully
valued and appraised without consideration of the excess cash selfishly withheld by the
Remaining Shareholders, that excess cash should be valued and distributed proportionately
between all three shareholders. This court should adjust Peterson's award to reflect the true
fair value of Peterson's shares in PAJ of $505,625.00, by supplementing the $459,000.00 he
was awarded in the trial court with an additional award of $46,625.00 to account for
Peterson's entitlements in the PAJ undistributed cash.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD PETERSON
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AT THE RATE OF TEN PERCENT PER
ANNUM.
Because Peterson satisfies the prejudgment interest standard, and because the Utah

Legislature has mandated and given direction as to the amount of prejudgment interest to be
awarded when the prejudgment interest standard is satisfied, Peterson is entitled to an award
of prejudgment interest at the rate often percent per annum and accruing from December 31,
2006.
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2) is Utah's prejudgment interest statute and provides
"[ujnless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10 % per
annum." Prejudgment interest is appropriate where the damage is complete, the amount of
loss is fixed as of a particular time, and the loss can be measured by facts and figures. Fell v.
Union Pac. R.R., 88 P. 1003, 1005, 32 Utah 101 (Utah 1907); see also Smith v. Fairfax
Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41,117, 82 P.3d 1064.
45

Applying the aforementioned prejudgment interest standard, the trial court correctly
determined that the damage to Peterson was complete, that his damages were fixed as of
December 31, 2006, that his damages could be measured by facts and figures to a
mathematical certainty, and, as a result of the foregoing, that Peterson was entitled to an
award of prejudgment interest. (R. at 621-622). Further, the court correctly determined that
neither PAJ's articles of incorporation, bylaws, nor any other agreement between the parties,
specify a specific rate of interest that is to be applied in the case of a buyout of a
shareholder's shares, or any other obligation owing to one of the parties. Id. However, the
court failed to follow the mandates and direction of the prejudgment interest statute's
requirement that prejudgment interest be awarded at the rate often percent.
The purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to compensate a party for the
depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, as a corollary, to deter parties from
intentionally withholding an amount that is liquidated and owing. Encon Utah, LLC v. Fluor
Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, ^[67, 210 P.3d 263. Since making its election to purchase
Peterson's shares, PA J has known it was obligated to pay interest on the fair values. (R. at
66-67). Since December 31, 2006, until well after the trial, PAJ intentionally withheld
making any payment to Peterson, and has had use of the funds to which Peterson was
entitled. Thus, it would be inequitable and unjustly discriminatory to fail to award Peterson
prejudgment interest at the legislatively determined statutory rate often percent from that
effective date.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(c) provides, "[ijnterest may be allowed at the rate
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and from the date determined by the court to be equitable." To the extent that there is
inconsistency in the statutes, this court should resolve and harmonize such conflict. Although
the term "interest" is not defined in the dissolution statute, it is defined in the similar
dissenters' rights statute, within the same Act. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1301(5) defines
"interest" as "interest from the effective date of the corporate action until the date of
payment, at the statutory rate set forth in Section 15-1-1, compounded annually." In Berrett
v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court advocates the
position that the same term used in different areas of the Utah Code are defined the same
way. Id. at 369-70. In Berrett, the definition of the word "qualified" was at issue. The court
looked to other uses of the word in the same act in holding, "[i]n determining the scope of the
term 'qualified' in section 16-11-13, it is helpful to examine preceding sections within the
same Act. Indeed, to interpret section 16-11-13, basic rules of statutory construction compel
us to look at the Professional Corporation Act in its entirety." Id.
Thus, even if an award of prejudgment interest does not compel a court to award the
statutorily prescribed amount often percent per annum in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
15-1-1(2), the Utah Legislature has given courts direction as to the rate of prejudgment
interest in dissolving shareholder disputes under the Utah Corporations Code, by defining the
term elsewhere in the Act. Therefore, in making its determination of the amount of interest
due and payable to Peterson under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(c), this court should
apply the statutorily prescribed rate often percent in accordance Utah Code Ann. § 15-1 -1 (2)
or should defer to the definition of interest in the same chapter of the Code, Utah Code Ann.
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§ 16-1 Oa-1301 (5), which bases interest determinations on the prejudgment interest statute, or
should make specific findings as to why the court is justified in deviating from the statutorily
prescribed rate often percent.
By enacting Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), the Utah Legislature determined the
appropriate rate of interest in prejudgment interest awards to be ten percent in cases where
neither the statute nor the parties have provided a specific rate. This is to protect the
depreciating value of an amount owed and is to deter parties from withholding an amount
owing. Absent any clear and compelling equitable reason, specific to the circumstances of
the case at hand, why the court should deviate from the prejudgment interest rate statute, the
trial court should not substitute its judgment for that of the Utah Legislature. No compelling
equitable reasoning was given as to the reason why the trial court arbitrarily awarded a lesser
rate of interest than prescribed by statute.
The trial court correctly determined that Peterson was denied the right to use the value
of his shares as desired during the prejudgment period; a period during which he was
terminated and unemployed by the company. (R. at 621-22). PAJ, to this day continues to
retain much of these funds, has had use of these funds, and has refused to make payment to
Peterson. Peterson should be awarded prejudgment interest at the rate often percent.
III.

BECAUSE PAJ ENGAGED IN OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND/OR
MISAPPLICATION OR WASTING OF CORPORATE ASSETS, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD PETERSON HIS COSTS AND
ATTORNEYS' FEES
In order to force Peterson out of PAJ under terms favorable to the Remaining

Shareholders, the Remaining Shareholders engaged in oppressive conduct and otherwise
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violated their fiduciary duties to Peterson, thus, entitling Peterson to an award of costs and
attorneys' fees. Further, the Remaining Shareholders engaged in misapplication or wasting
of corporate assets that likewise entitles Peterson to an award of costs and attorneys' fees.
The issue on this point is not a question of fact, but one of law. The court made sufficient
findings of fact regarding the conduct of PAJ and the shareholders. It is a question of law,
reviewed by the standard of correctness, whether those facts warrant an award of costs and
attorneys' fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa- 1434(5)(d) provides "[i]f the court finds that the petitioning
shareholder had probable grounds for relief under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(b) or (d), it
may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of counsel and
experts employed by the petitioning shareholder." Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) establishes
grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation. Subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(b) provides
grounds for dissolution if "the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are
acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent." Subsection 16-10a1430(2)(d) provides grounds for dissolution if "the corporate assets are being misapplied or
wasted."
A.

Due to oppressive behavior and breach of fiduciary duties by the Remaining
Shareholders against Peterson, Peterson's investment interest, as a founding
shareholder of PAJ, was thwarted.
In McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, 220 P.3d 146, a minority shareholder of a

corporation was terminated and brought suit against the corporation for breach of fiduciary
duty. The Supreme Court of Utah considered whether shareholders of CHC's should be
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treated differently than shareholders of publicly traded corporations when applying the
provisions of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act, such as in the case al hand. Id.
The Supreme Court of Utah determined that the fiduciary duties applicable to partnerships,
should likewise be applicable to shareholders of a closely held corporation; namely, each
shareholder having a duty to observe the utmost good faith towards his co-shareholders in all
dealings and transactions that come within the scope of the corporation's business. Id. at
1HJ16, 23. The Supreme Court determined that imposing fiduciary duties was necessary
because "shareholders in close corporations are easily subjected to freeze outs, squeeze outs,
and other forms of oppression." Id. at ^22. These enhanced fiduciary duties are used to
"stem[] shareholder oppression." Id. Thus, a violation of the fiduciary duties constitutes
oppression. Id. The McLaughlin court also determined shareholder oppression is found
when a "shareholder's investment expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another
shareholder's actions." Id. at ]|24.
Applying the aforementioned principles to the case before it, the Supreme Court of
Utah determined that the termination of an employee is not always oppressive and a breach of
fiduciary duty. Id. at ^[26-27.

It further stated when considering an allegation of

"oppressive conduct" a court should review:
[W]hat the majority shareholders knew, or should have known, to be the
petitioner's expectations in entering the particular enterprise. Majority conduct
should not be deemed oppressive simply because the petitioner's subjective
hopes and desires in joining the venture are not fulfilled. Disappointment
alone should not necessarily be equated with oppression.
Id at^|27.
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The McLaughlin court determined that because the plaintiff was "not a founding
member [of the corporation] who created the company with the expectation of employment",
and because his primary reason for joining the corporation was employment rather than
investment, that his investment expectation in the company was not thwarted, and, thus, the
actions of the corporation were not oppressive nor a breach of fiduciary duties. Id. at ^[28.
However, frustration of a minority shareholder's reasonable investment expectations can
amount to oppression sufficient to justify dissolution of a corporation. Colt v. ML Princeton
Trout Club, 78 P.3d 1115 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
Unlike the plaintiff in McLaughlin, Peterson's investment expectancy was thwarted by
PAJ's oppressive conduct. Peterson was a founding member of this entity in 1984, and
helped create this company with the expectation of continued employment. (R. at 53, 110).
This expectation was satisfied for approximately 22 years, until the Remaining Shareholders
engaged in the oppressive activities that prohibited Peterson from continuing his employment
with the accounting firm he established. (R. at 1-8, 43). Peterson had established PAJ with
the expectancy of continued employment. And, Peterson committed his capital to this
venture with the expectation of continued employment, thus, Peterson's investment and his
employment are sufficiently linked such that his continued employment was part of
Peterson's investment interest. When Peterson was terminated, his investment interest was
harmed and he was oppressed.

See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v.

Employment At Will in the Close Corporation: The Investment Model Solution, 1999 U. 111.
L. Rev. 517, 551-556 (1999) (cited in McLaughlin, 2009 UT 64 at ^|24) (attached hereto as
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Addendum, Exhibit B).
In sum, if a particular CHC shareholder reasonably expects that his investment entitles
him to continued employment, the employment and the job should be viewed as sufficiently
linked, and the job should be seen, in a procurement of employment sense, as part of the
shareholder's protected investment.

1999 U. 111. L. Rev. at 552. When this specific

reasonable expectation is established, a termination effectively harms the shareholder's
investment and should, therefore, trigger liability for oppression. Id.
Utah courts relate oppression to a breach of an enhanced fiduciary duty owed between
shareholders in a CHC and tie oppression to the "frustration of the reasonable expectations of
the shareholders." From this, it is clear that members of a CHC cannot unequivocally "make
decisions that they deem in the best interest of the company; however unpleasant they may
be". (R. at 623). Contrary to the justification articulated in the trial court's April 17, 2009
Decision, members of a CHC owe each other a duty of utmost good faith and loyalty. All
shareholders of the corporation are entitled to the benefit of such fiduciary duty and the
majority cannot frustrate the reasonable investment expectations of the minority shareholders
without causing oppression and grounds for dissolution. See McLaughlin, 2009 UT 64 at
118.
Breaches of the fiduciary duty owed by CHC shareholders and oppression of minority
shareholders arise in several circumstances, the facts of which commonly overlap. Id. at ^[24.
These circumstances may be unequal treatment, frustration of reasonable expectations of
involvement, and a freeze-out or squeeze-out. Id. In all cases there is a common element, a
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shareholder's investment expectation in a close corporation is frustrated by another
shareholder's actions. Id. A New York court, applying the "frustration of reasonable
expectations standard" adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah in McLaughlin, stated that
"oppressive actions . . . refer to conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable
expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their capital to the particular
enterprise." In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173,1179,64 N.Y. 2d 63 (N.Y. 1984).
The New York court continued, as follows:
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation
would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in
corporate management, or some other form of security, would be oppressed in
a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those
expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment...
[Oppression should be deemed to arise only when the majority conduct
substantially defeats expectations that, objectively viewed, were both
reasonable under the circumstances and were central to the petitioner's
decision to join the venture.
Id
Consequently, minority stockholders must rely for protection on the fiduciary duties
owed to them by the board of directors for protection against oppressive behavior. Bingham
Consolidation Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, TJ22,105 P.3d 365; see also Kiriakides v.
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257 (S.C. 2001) (for purposes of determining
whether minority shareholders are entitled to judicial dissolution of a corporation based on
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial behavior of directors or those in control, the term
"oppressive" means: "1) A visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation
of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to
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rely; or 2) A breach of the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing; or 3) Whether the
reasonable expectations of the minority shareholders have been frustrated by the actions of
the majority; or 4) A lack of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the
prejudice of some of its members; or 5) A deprivation by majority shareholders of
participation in management by minority shareholders").
The Remaining Shareholders have engaged in behavior violative of their fiduciary
duties to both PAJ and to Peterson individually. This behavior was unlawful, wrongful, and,
most importantly for present purposes, oppressive. They have also failed to "deal fairly and
openly" with Peterson, have thwarted Peterson's reasonable investment expectations in the
professional corporation he founded, have failed to satisfy the requirement of good faith and
fair dealing in their business with Peterson, and have acted in depriving and prejudicial ways
towards Peterson.
Peterson was a founder of the Corporation and was actively involved in its
management since its foundation. (R. at 53, 110). Peterson engaged in no behavior contrary
to the Corporation's policies and expectations and had acted in the best interests of the
Corporation. The Remaining Shareholders, on the other hand, have violated their fiduciary
duties to the detriment of Peterson's interests, leaving Peterson no choice but to file suit to
protect his interests. (R. at 3-5, 42-46). Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the Remaining
Shareholders colluded against Peterson in a self-serving effort to force Peterson out of the
Corporation and to benefit themselves at Peterson's and the Corporation's detriment. Id.
Specifically, in violation of their fiduciary duties, the Remaining Shareholders failed
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to make timely and relevant disclosures of necessary corporate information to Peterson
including unreported and unrecorded services to corporate clients, plans to terminate
employees, questionable and unauthorized distributions of corporate funds and failure to
distribute corporate funds proportionately, and plans to undermine Peterson's position and
rights within the Corporation. Id.
Peterson was denied corporate records and information, computer passwords were
changed to prevent his access to corporate information, and Mr. Peterson was evicted from
his office. (R. at 3-5, 42-46, 622-24); T. Vol. II at 348-50. The Remaining Shareholders
even solicited and instructed PAJ employees and clients to side with them and against
Peterson. Id. Key employees were threatened and informed that Peterson would be
terminated and not be associated with the firm any further. Id.
All this oppressive behavior took place in advance of any formal notice or action to
restructure the operations of the corporation. Then in an attempt to justify such behavior, the
Remaining Shareholders served Peterson with notice of a special shareholder meeting, to take
place to approve certain amendments to the Corporation's bylaws that would change PAJ's
officers, management, and procedures in their favor, which were damaging and adverse to
Peterson's interests. (R. at 45-46).
After Peterson filed his Verified Complaint, the oppressive and abusive behavior
continued. The aforementioned special shareholder meeting took place and the damaging
amendments were approved irrespective of Peterson's minority opposition and expectations.
Further, the Remaining Shareholders conducted other shareholder meetings and wrongfully
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excluded Peterson from corporate meetings and decisions. They conspired to damage
Peterson by depriving him of his ownership rights and terminating his employment in the
Corporation. They further deprived Peterson of his rightful profits and compensation both
directly and by manipulating accountings and decisions. For example, for approximately
three months, PAJ and the Remaining Shareholders failed to pay Peterson his salary. (R. at
45). In 2006, they also failed to proportionally distribute available profits and dividends. (R.
at 618, 620). These funds were withheld, despite promises from Allred that appropriate
distributions would be made to Peterson, and then selfishly retained by the Remaining
Shareholders under the guise of a wccash reserve." (R. at 620).
Since filing the Complaint, the Remaining Shareholders continued to deny Peterson
access to, among other things, corporate assets, records, information, reports, and property. T.
Vol. II at 348-50. The Remaining Shareholders have misrepresented Peterson's position and
interest in the corporation to clients and other business contacts, have spoken negatively
about him, and have otherwise engaged in unreasonable, oppressive, and offensive activity
directed against Peterson. See examples Trial Exhibits 188, 192.
The aforementioned behavior is by definition oppressive and has significantly
interfered with Peterson's lawful rights and reasonable investment expectations which should
be protected by the fiduciary duties of CHC shareholders to one another. Judicial dissolution
would have been proper under Utah Code Ann. §16-10a- 1430(2)(b). Moreover, Defendants
have conceded the grounds for dissolution. Thus, Peterson is entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. § 16~10a-1434(5)(d).
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B.

Because dissolution would have been proper due to the Remaining Shareholders'
misapplication or waste of corporate assets, Peterson is entitled to an award of
attorneys' fees and costs
PAJ and the Remaining Shareholders engaged in conduct constituting misapplication

or waste of corporate assets. Directors and officers of corporations have a fiduciary duty of
loyalty to their corporation and its stockholders and are "obliged to . . . preserve and enhance
the property and earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the corporation are
in conflict with their own personal interests." Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah
1982).
The Model Business Corporation Act and corporation statutes in many jurisdictions
permit judicial dissolution of a corporation in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is
established that the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted. See Utah Code Ann. §
16-10a-1430(2)(d). In Thompson's Point v. Safe Harbor Dev. Corp., 862 F. Supp 594 (D.
Me. 1994), a company president's blatant self dealing in paying himself excessive funds
amounted to misapplication of corporate resources providing grounds for dissolution of
corporation.
The Remaining Shareholders of PAJ engaged in behavior constituting misapplication
and waste of corporate assets. For example, PAJ had a longstanding policy requiring each
employee to maintain daily records of their work time and billings, and that all work in
progress and billable time be promptly and fully recorded. (R. at 43-44,623). All employees,
including Jackson, were to bill clients on an hourly basis, unless a specific exception were
authorized. Jackson had, for some time, failed to follow the corporate policy requiring each
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employee to maintain daily records of their work time and that all work in progress and
billable time be promptly and fully recorded. Id. This failure to satisfy corporate policy was
in contravention of his duties as an employee, officer and shareholder, and was contrary to
the interests of PAJ and Peterson individually. Id.
Jackson also failed to undertake reasonably diligent efforts to bill and collect money
from clients with outstanding bills. (R. at 56-57). Jackson's failure to keep accurate business
records, bill clients for time spent, record and report his time and activity as an employee, and
to collect outstanding amounts due on accounts assigned to him, constituted a waste of
corporate assets and misuse of corporate opportunity which justified a judicial dissolution of
the Corporation.
Allred and Jackson also failed and refused to distribute profits in a fair and
proportionate manner. As previously mentioned, for approximately three months PAJ and
the Remaining Shareholders decided to not pay Peterson his salary. At this time they also
failed to proportionally distribute available profits and dividends, and, instead, under the
guise of establishing a "cash reserve," decided to withhold these funds until Peterson was
kicked out of PAJ. The consequence of this action was to deny Peterson his 36.37 percent of
that cash.
Peterson is, therefore, entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs under Utah
Code Ann. § 16- 10a-1434(5)(d) through satisfaction of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2)(d).
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C.

The trial court erred in determining the aforementioned behavior did not constitute
oppressive behavior or misapplication or waste of corporate assets sufficient to justify
a dissolution of PAJ under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(d)
The trial court's findings demonstrate sufficient grounds to determine the Remaining

Shareholders engaged in oppressive behavior and the misapplication or waste of PAJ assets,
thus, entitling Peterson to an award of attorneys' fees and costs under Utah Code Ann. §1610a-1434(5)(d). Regarding oppressive behavior by the Remaining Shareholders, the trial
court in the case at issue found as follows:
[Peterson] was denied corporate records and information, computer passwords
were changed to prevent his access to corporate information, employees and
clients were solicited and instructed to side with [Allred and Jackson] and
[Peterson] was evicted from his office ... Employees were forced to pick
between their jobs and loyalty to the remaining partners. [Peterson] was
removed both physically and emotionally from the accounting firm that he
helped start over 22 years ago.
(R. at 623.)
Based on these findings the court concluded, "while [Allred's and Jackson's] actions
may have been insensitive, disloyal, exclusionary, or overly aggressive, they were not
oppressive." Id at 623-624. (emphasis added). Then the court concluded that "Jackson's
admitted billing practices could be described as contrary to his espoused philosophy of sound
fiscal management of the company", but they do not amount to misapplication or a waste of
corporate assets. Id. at 624. The trial court then denied attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
The findings above, and the findings throughout the court's Decision and
Memorandum Decision, show that the Remaining Shareholders have failed to satisfy their
fiduciary obligations and have, thus, engaged in oppressive behavior and activities involving
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the misapplication and wasting of assets. These oppressive and wasteful activities, even if
PAJ did not elect to purchase Peterson's shares in lieu of dissolving the corporation, would
have been sufficient grounds upon which to judicially dissolve the Corporation under Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2)(b) and/or Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2)(d). Thus, Peterson
is as a matter of law entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 161 Oa-1434(5)(d), and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court for a determination
of such an award.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, this court should find that all PAJ's contentions fail as a
matter of law, and also fail as a matter of fact due to PAJ's failure to satisfy the marshaling
requirement. This court should specifically conclude that the findings of fact contained in
the trial court's decisions are sufficient as a matter of law, that the trial court treated PAJ's
goodwill properly in its fair value determination, and that the Decision did not contain a
clerical error regarding the Jackson "buy in" price and formula warranting or needing
revision. All PAJ's claims and requests contained in its Brief of Appellant should be denied.
Peterson seeks a ruling that the trial court erred in failing to award Peterson his 36.37
percent share of the excess cash on hand as of the valuation date, in failing to grant Peterson
prejudgment interest at a rate of ten percent, and in failing to determine the Remaining
Shareholders engaged in oppressive behavior and misapplication or waste of corporate assets.
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Peterson should be awarded an additional $46,625.00, constituting his share of the
PAJ undistributed cash on hand as of the valuation date. Peterson should be awarded
prejudgment interest on the final total judgment amount at the statutory prejudgment interest
rate of ten percent. Finally, this matter should be remanded for the purpose of awarding
Peterson his attorneys' fees and costs, at trial and on appeal, due to PAJ's and the Remaining
Shareholders' oppressive behavior and misapplication or wasting of PAJ corporate assets.
Oral argument is requested.
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) Peterson explicitly requests an
award of attorney's fees incurred by Peterson on this appeal. Peterson has submitted
concurrently herewith a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs Incurred on Appeal and a
memorandum in support of said motion, setting forth the legal basis for such an award.

DATED this 2 & 1 * day of March, 2010
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.

'James C. Jenkin^
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee and
Cross-Appellant

61

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 3*buay of March, 2010,1 caused to be hand delivered,
one original and seven copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSSAPPELLANT, to the Utah Court of Appeals, and hand delivered two true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to Gary Anderson, Brian Cannell, and Mark
Hancey (c/o Hilly ard Anderson & Olsen), Hilly ard Anderson & Olsen, 399 North Main,
Suite 300, Logan, Utah 84321.

J:\JCJ\PLEADINGS\Peterson, Jack\Court of Appeals\COMBINED~ DRAFT Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant.3.17 10.doc
N-11021

Tab A

EXHIBIT A
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following are the constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or
regulations determinative or of central importance to this appeal.
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 15-1 -1 (2009)

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1430(2)(b) and (d) (2009)

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(1) (2009)

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1434(5)(c) and (d) (2009)

The aforementioned citations are set forth verbatim in this Exhibit A.
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TITLE 15. CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 1. INTEREST
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (2009)
§ 15-1-1. Interest rates — Contracted rate — Legal rate
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance
of any money, goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract.
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest
for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall be 10% per annum.
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any way to affect any penalty or interest charge
that by law applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or obligations made before May
14, 1981.
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NOTES: CROSS-REFERENCES. -Payment of interest as extending statute of limitations, § 78B2-113.
Rate where unspecified in instrument, § 70A-3-118.
Time from which interest runs, § 70A-3-112.
Utah Consumer Credit Code, § 70C-1-101 et seq.
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ANALYSIS
Amount of award.
Contracted rate.
Damages for breach of contract.
Debts overdue.
Determination of damages.
Determining interest rate.
Eminent domain.
Federal court.
— Federal question.
Garnishment proceedings.
Installments.
Nature of award.
Right to interest.
School districts.
School trust lands.
Unconscionability.
Cited.
AMOUNT OF AWARD.
Trial judge was required as a matter of law to award the statutorily mandated rate, even though,
with the passage of time, the award had become large. Mont Trucking, Inc. v. Entrada Indus., Inc.,
802 P.2d 779 (Utah App. 1990).
CONTRACTED RATE.
Thirty percent per annum default interest rate agreed to by a corporate borrower under the terms
of a note was not substantively unconscionable because the borrower was not inexperienced in such
agreements, the interest rate under the note was lower than the interest rates of the two prior notes
the note refinanced, and the lender assumed more than a minimal amount of risk in refinancing the
borrower's earlier loans. Cantamar, LLC. v. Champagne, 2006 UTApp 321, 142 P.3d 140.
Plaintiff roofer was entitled to postjudgment interest at the rate specified in its contract with
homeowners. Deficiencies in the roofer's performance could be remedied by an appropriate offset
award, but the court could not try to account for the deficiencies by altering the parties' contractually agreed-upon interest terms. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, LLC v. Sturzenegger, 2007
UTApp 100, 574 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 158 P.3d 556.
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
Interest allowed on damages for breach of contract under a lease should be governed by the statutory interest rate in effect on the date that the lease was entered into, not the rate in effect on the
date that the damages occurred. SCMLand Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986).
DEBTS OVERDUE.
In Utah, interest is allowed on debts overdue, even in absence of statute or contract providing
therefor. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 7 Utah 8, 24 P. 586 (1890), affd, 151 U.S.
317, 14 S Ct. 348, 38 L Ed. 177(1894).

Page 3
Utah Code Ann. § 1 5 - 1 - 1

DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES.
This rate cannot be used as a basis of arriving at the reasonable earning power of money, in estimating damages plaintiff is entitled to in action for personal injuries. Klinge v. Southern Pac. Co.,
89 Utah 284, 57 P.2d 367, 105 A.L.R. 204 (1936).
Prejudgment interest is inappropriate if the damages cannot be determined with mathematical precision. Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
A court may award prejudgment interest if the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the amount
of the loss can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Baker v. Dataphase, Inc., 781 F. Supp.
724 (D. Utah 1992).
DETERMINING INTEREST RATE.
The statutory legal rate of interest is applied from the date payment is due to the judgment date.
Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Where July 7, 1981, the date defendant signed the settlement statement, was the due date, as that
was the date the benefit was conferred and it was also on this date that defendants acknowledged an
obligation to pay plaintiffs for their services in constructing duplexes, the appropriate rate of interest
was 10 percent. Davies v. Olson, 746P.2d264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Prejudgment interest on a contract executed before the rate provided by this section was raised to
10% should accrue at 6% per annum, the pre-amendment rate. Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799
P.2d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Where the defendant's original note provided no pre-default interest, but plaintiff inserted "N" in
the appropriate blank, and where the blank for the rate of default interest was left unfilled, there was
no agreement as to a default interest rate, no waiver of default interest, and the statutory rate under
this section applied. Harrington Properties, Inc. v. Peterson, 1999 UT App 28, 973 P.2d 1004.
Where a farm lease contained no provision concerning interest, this section applied, and the trial
court properly calculated interest at ten percent on the amounts due under the lease. Young v. Young,
1999UT38,979P.2d338.
Trial court's denial of remittitur was an abuse of discretion because there was no evidence in the
record to support the jury's addition of nearly $100,000 to the figures calculated by the plaintiffs'
accounting expert, who apparently derived the interest rate from the parties' partnership agreements.
Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 2003 UT41, 483 Utah Adv. Rep 15, 82 P.3d 1064.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
A condemnee is entitled to interest at the statutory rate from the date of an order of immediate occupancy to the date of judgment. State ex rel. Road Comm. v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 247 P.2d
900 (1952).
FEDERAL COURT.
- FEDERAL QUESTION.
A federal court is not bound by the statutory interest rate of the forum state in a federal question
case, such as one brought under the Federal Quiet Title Act. The court, therefore, should apply federal common law in setting the prejudgment interest rate. Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 663 F.
Supp 998 (D. Utah 1987), affd, 852 F.2d 1581 (10th Cir. 1988).
GARNISHMENT PROCEEDINGS.
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In garnishment proceedings, the garnishee is typically a neutral party to the garnishment proceedings. However, a trial court has the discretion to award prejudgment interest when a garnishee becomes unduly partisan or otherwise obstructs the process. A garnishee's improper conduct, including its collusive support of either the judgment creditor or judgment debtor, may lead a trial court to
assess prejudgment interest against it. Whitney v. Faulkner, 2004 UT 52, 502 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 95
P.3d270.
INSTALLMENTS.
Defaulting maker on installment note was liable for interest on sums in default at ratefixedby this
section. Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320, 145 P. 1036 (1915).
NATURE OF AWARD.
Prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due to the defendants' delay in
tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other obligation. Baker v. Dataphase,
Inc., 781 F. Supp. 724 (D. Utah 1992).
Under agreement in which party could require "progress payments," subject to interest, until the
commencement of a lease agreement, the accumulated interest was not an invalid penalty but
agreed-upon interest valid under this section. Republic Bank v. AMTEC Precision Prods., Inc., 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54559 (D. Utah July 27, 2007).
RIGHT TO INTEREST.
This section does nothing more than define what the rate of interest should be in those instances
where interest accrues as a matter of law but no specific rate has been agreed to; it does not create a
right to interest where none otherwise exists. Vali Convalescent & Care Insts. v. Division ofHealth
Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
An award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate when the jury must determine the loss by using
its best judgment as to valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation. BC Tech., Inc. v. Ensil
Int'l Corp., 2009 US. Dist. LEXIS 1829 (D. Utah Jan. 9, 2009).
SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
School district, where it has received the benefit of goods, should pay the legal rate of interest
from the date it received the benefit of its contract. Baker Lumber Co. v. A.A. Clark Co., 53 Utah
336, 178 P. 764(1919).
SCHOOL TRUST LANDS.
Interest rates and penalties established by properly promulgated administrative rules applied to a
lease involving school trust lands; this section did not apply. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of
State Lands & Forestry, 886 P. 2d 514 (Utah 1994).
UNCONSCIONABILITY.
Where one loaning money had received the full amount of money loaned and interest amounting
to 15% per annum, the debt was held fully paid, and the lender could not recover anything in addition. Carter v. West, 38 Utah 381, 113 P. 1025 (1910).
CITED in Ringwoodv. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Sprouse v.
Jager, 806 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664 (Utah 1992); Omasta
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v. Choices Ben. Plan, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Utah 2004); N.A.R, Inc. v. Elmer, 2006 UTApp
293, 141 P.3d 606.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
BRIGHAM YOUNG LAW REVIEW. -Usury Implications of Alternative Mortgage Instruments:
The Uncertainty in Calculating Permissible Returns, 1986B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1105.
Trial Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestry: Can States Retroactively
Alter Their Own Contractual Obligations?, 1997B.Y.U. L. Rev. 943.
AM. JUR. 2D. --44B Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury § 46 et seq.
CJ.S. —47 C.J.S. Interest and Usury; Consumer Credit § 9 et seq.
A.L.R. —Construction and effect of disclosure statutes requiring one extending credit or making
loan to give statement showing terms as to amounts involved and charges made, 14 A.L.R.3d330.
Validity and construction of provision (escalator clause) in land contract or mortgage that rate of
interest payable shall increase if legal rate is raised, 60A.L.R.3d473.
Compensation for interest prepayment penalty in eminent domain proceedings, 84 A.L.R 3d 946.
Prejudgment interest awards in divorce cases, 62 A.L.RAth 156.
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§ 16-10a-1430. Grounds for judicial dissolution
(1) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by the attorney general or the division director
if it is established that:
(a) the corporation obtained its articles of incorporation through fraud; or
(b) the corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the authority conferred upon it by law.
(2) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that:
(a) the directors are deadlocked in the management of the corporate affairs, the shareholders
are unable to break the deadlock, irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered, or the business and affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of
the shareholders generally, because of the deadlock;
(b) the directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a
manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent;
(c) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power and have failed, for a period that includes
at least two consecutive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon the election of their successors; or
(d) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
(3) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by a creditor if it is established that:
(a) the creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment, the execution on the judgment has been
returned unsatisfied, and the corporation is insolvent; or
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(b) the corporation is insolvent and the corporation has admitted in writing that the creditor's
claim is due and owing.
(4) A corporation may be dissolved in a proceeding by the corporation to have its voluntary dissolution continued under court supervision.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-1430, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 165.
NOTES:
LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations
Dissolution & Liquidation of General Business Forms
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§ 16-10a-1434. Election to purchase in lieu of dissolution
(1) In a proceeding under Subsection 16-10a-l430(2) to dissolve a corporation that has no shares
listed on a national securities exchange or regularly traded in a market maintained by one or more
members of a national or affiliated securities association, the corporation may elect, or if it fails to
elect, one or more shareholders may elect to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the
petitioning shareholder, at the fair value of the shares, determined as provided in this section. An
election pursuant to this section is irrevocable unless the court determines that it is equitable to set
aside or modify the election.
(2) (a) An election to purchase pursuant to this section may be filed with the court at any time
within 90 days after the filing of the petition under Subsection 16-10a-l 430(2) or at any later time
as the court in its discretion may allow. If the corporation files an election with the court within the
90-day period, or at any later time allowed by the court, to purchase all shares of the corporation
owned by the petitioning shareholder, the corporation shall purchase the shares in the manner provided in this section.
(b) If the corporation does not file an election with the court within the time period, but an
election to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder is filed by
one or more shareholders within the time period, the corporation shall, within ten days after the later
of:
(i) the end of the time period allowed for the filing of elections to purchase under this section; or
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(ii) notification from the court of an election by shareholders to purchase all shares of the
corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder as provided in this section, give written notice
of the election to purchase to all shareholders of the corporation, other than the petitioning shareholder. The notice shall state the name and number of shares owned by the petitioning shareholder
and the name and number of shares owned by each electing shareholder. The notice shall advise any
recipients who have not participated in the election of their right to join in the election to purchase
shares in accordance with this section, and of the date by which any notice of intent to participate
must be filed with the court.
(c) Shareholders who wish to participate in the purchase of shares from the petitioning shareholder must file notice of their intention to join in the purchase by the electing shareholders, no later
than 30 days after the effective date of the corporation's notice of their right to join in the election to
purchase.
(d) All shareholders who have filed with the court an election or notice of their intention to
participate in the election to purchase the shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder thereby become irrevocably obligated to participate in the purchase of shares from the petitioning shareholders upon the terms and conditions of this section, unless the court otherwise directs.
(e) After an election has been filed by the corporation or one or more shareholders, the proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) may not be discontinued or settled, nor may the petitioning shareholder sell or otherwise dispose of any shares of the corporation, unless the court determines that it would be equitable to the corporation and the shareholders, other than the petitioning
shareholders, to permit any discontinuance, settlement, sale, or other disposition.
(3) If, within 60 days after the earlier of:
(a) the corporation's filing of an election to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by
the petitioning shareholder; or
(b) the corporation's mailing of a notice to its shareholders of the filing of an election by the
shareholders to purchase all shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder, the
petitioning shareholder and electing corporation or shareholders reach agreement as to the fair value
and terms of purchase of the petitioning shareholder's shares, the court shall enter an order directing
the purchase of petitioner's shares, upon the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties.
(4) If the parties are unable to reach an agreement as provided for in Subsection (3), upon application of any party the court shall stay the proceedings under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) and determine the fair value of the petitioning shareholder's shares as of the day before the date on which
the petition under Subsection 16-10a-1430(2) was filed or as of any other date the court determines
to be appropriate under the circumstances and based on the factors the court determines to be appropriate.
(5) (a) Upon determining the fair value of the shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning
shareholder, the court shall enter an order directing the purchase of the shares upon terms and conditions the court determines to be appropriate. The terms and conditions may include payment of
the purchase price in installments, where necessary in the interests of equity, provision for security
to assure payment of the purchase price and any additional costs, fees, and expenses awarded by the
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court, and an allocation of shares among shareholders if the shares are to be purchased by shareholders.
(b) In allocating the petitioning shareholders' shares among holders of different classes of
shares, the court shall attempt to preserve the existing distribution of voting rights among holders of
different share classes to the extent practicable. The court may direct that holders of a specific class
or classes shall not participate in the purchase. The court may not require any electing shareholder
to purchase more of the shares of the corporation owned by the petitioning shareholder than the
number of shares that the purchasing shareholder may have set forth in his election or notice of intent to participate filed with the court as the maximum number of shares he is willing to purchase.
(c) Interest may be allowed at the rate and from the date determined by the court to be equitable. However, if the court finds that the refusal of the petitioning shareholder to accept an offer of
payment was arbitrary or otherwise not in good faith, interest may not be allowed.
(d) If the court finds that the petitioning shareholder had probable grounds for relief under
Subsection 16-10a-1430(2)(b) or (d), it may award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees
and expenses of counsel and experts employed by the petitioning shareholder.
(6) Upon entry of an order under Subsection (3) or (5), the court shall dismiss the petition to dissolve the corporation under Section 16-10a-1430, and the petitioning shareholder shall no longer
have any rights or status as a shareholder of the corporation, except the right to receive the amounts
awarded to him by the court. The award is enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment.
(7) (a) The purchase ordered pursuant to Subsection (5) shall be made within ten days after the
date the order becomes final, unless before that time the corporation files with the court a notice of
its intention to adopt articles of dissolution pursuant to Sections 16~10a-1402 and 16-I0a-1403. The
articles of dissolution must then be adopted and filed within 50 days after notice.
(b) Upon filing of the articles of dissolution, the corporation is dissolved in accordance with
the provisions of Sections 16-10a-1405 through 16-10a-1408, and the order entered pursuant to
Subsection (5) is no longer of any force or effect. However, the court may award the petitioning
shareholder reasonable fees and expenses in accordance with the provisions of Subsection (5)(d).
The petitioning shareholder may continue to pursue any claims previously asserted on behalf of the
corporation.
(8) Any payment by the corporation pursuant to an order under Subsection (3) or (5), other than
an award of fees and expenses pursuant to Subsection (5)(d), is subject to the provisions of Section
16-10a-640.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 16-10a-1434, enacted by L. 1992, ch. 277, § 169.
NOTES:
LexisNexis 50 State Surveys, Legislation & Regulations
Dissolution & Liquidation of General Business Forms
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SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION V. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
IN THE CLOSE CORPORATION:
THE INVESTMENT MODEL SOLUTION
1999 U. I I I . L. REV. 517
DOUGLAS K. MOLL

The section of this article referenced in the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
entitled "The Function of 'Reasonable Expectations' in the Investment Model of
Oppression'', comprises this Addendum, Exhibit B. The notes referred to in this section are
also included. This article, in its entirety, is included on and can be accessed through the
Enhanced Courtesy Brief.
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traditional employee usually has no direct control over whether he will be chosen for a particular
position or over whether he will be hired by the business at all. For example, there may be several
vice presidents of a public corporation who are sufficiently competent to serve as the chief executive officer (CEO) of the company. Nevertheless, assuming that there is only one CEO position,
there is only one vice president who will be selected to serve in that capacity. The decision, for the
most part, is out of the candidates' hands. In contrast, a close corporation participant can generally
insure that she is selected for a limited high-level position. This ability to insure selection is valuable, especially because a high-level position is generally associated with greater salary and prestige. nl34
Finally, and relatedly, a close corporation may be founded by individuals who desire to work for
themselves. Indeed, founding share holder-employees may have left junior positions in more stable
and established companies for the opportunity to run their own business and to serve as their own
bosses. nl35 A close corporation position, [*550] therefore, may carry the intangible value of
"being your own boss" - a value that is not present in many other employment contexts. nl36
Because close corporation employment provides these additional aspects of value, the retention
of a particular close corporation job may be a vital component of a shareholder-employee's return
on in vestment. The loss of a job, therefore, may eliminate a unique employment position that was
fundamental to the shareholder-employee's decision to commit capital to the venture. nl37
In short, employment is often a fundamental part of the close corporation investment, not only
because a portion of the salary and benefits typically represents de facto dividends, but also because
procuring the close corporation position itself may have been the prin [*551] cipal reason for the
shareholder-employee's investment in the business. nl38 In these two respects, shareholderemployees can be understood as having an investment interest in their jobs. nl39
D. The Function of "Reasonable Expectations" in the Investment Model of Oppression
As commentators have indicated, the reasonable expectations standard has been used in many jurisdictions "as the basis by which courts determine if minority shareholders are entitled to relief after dissension arises within a close corporation." n 140 In general, if challenged conduct frustrates
the reasonable expectations of a close corporation shareholder, the conduct is characterized as "oppressive" and the shareholder is eligible for relief. nl41
With the investment model of oppression, the reasonable expectations standard is used in a more
focused manner. When oppression is viewed as an investment-centered doctrine that protects the
value of a close corporation shareholder's investment, the implication is that oppression liability
arises when the value of a shareholder's investment is harmed. To determine if the value of an investment has been [*552] harmed, however, a court must be able to identify all of the components
of the investment; else, the value of the overall investment, and any damage to it, cannot be accurately measured.
This task of identifying the components of the investment should be seen as the function of the
reasonable expectations standard under the investment model of oppression. An inquiry into what
the share holder reasonably expected his investment entitled him to should be seen as an attempt to
link the commitment of capital to certain expected benefits such that the benefits can be characterized as components of the investment. For example, an inquiry into whether a shareholder reasonably expected continued employment should be understood as an inquiry into whether the share-
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holder reasonably expected that her investment in the venture entitled her to continued employment
with the close corporation. nl42 If the shareholder did have such a reasonable expectation, then
the job and the investment can be viewed as sufficiently linked such that continued employment can
fairly be characterized as part of the shareholder's investment. nl43 When that employment is terminated, therefore, the investment is damaged and oppression liability should arise. nl44
[*553] Under thisframework,a distinction must be drawn between "general" reasonable expectations and "specific" reasonable expectations. Every shareholder reasonably expects that her
commitment of capital entitles her to a proportionate share of the corporate earnings. nl45 Oppression liability should arise, therefore, whenever this "general" reasonable expectation isfrustratedi.e., whenever con trolling shareholders squeeze-out a minority shareholder from the business returns but continue to share in the corporate earnings themselves. nl46 When close corporation
employment is at issue, the general [*554] reasonable expectation inquiry is designed to identify
whether a job is part of a shareholder-employee's investment in a de facto dividend sense. nl47
Indeed, as mentioned, when a job is providing de facto dividends, a termination will often exclude
the discharged investor from his share in the corporate earnings. nl48 Such a termination frustrates
the general reasonable expectation and should give rise to oppression liability.
"Specific" reasonable expectations, however, are not held by every shareholder. The law recognizes that a close corporation investment - unlike a public corporation investment - may consist of
more than a mere stake in the corporate earnings. nl49 The purpose of the [*555] specific reasonable expectations inquiry, therefore, is to ferret out the components of a particular close corporation shareholder's investment beyond a proportionate share of earnings (e.g., a job, a management
position) such that these additional components can be protected by the oppression doctrine. When
close corporation employment is at is sue, the specific reasonable expectations inquiry is designed
to identify whether a job is part of a shareholder-employee's investment in a procurement of employment sense. nl50 For example, if a particular close corporation shareholder does not reasonably expect that his in vestment entitles him to continued employment, nl51 the employment and
the investment should not be viewed as sufficiently linked, and employment should not be characterized as part of the shareholder's protected investment. n!52 Conversely, if a particular close
corporation shareholder does reasonably expect that his investment entitles him to continued employment, the employment and the job should be viewed as sufficiently linked, and the job should
be seen, in a procurement of employment sense, as part of the shareholder's protected in vestment.
When this specific reasonable expectation is established, a termination effectively harms the shareholder's investment and should, therefore, trigger liability for oppression. nl53
[*556] As a whole, therefore, the investment model of oppression functions at three levels. At
the first level, oppression is viewed as a doc trine concerned with protecting the fair value of a close
corporation shareholder's investment. At the second level, the reasonable expectations standard is
utilized in a general sense to protect every close corporation shareholder's proportionate claim to the
corporate earnings. At the third level, the reasonable expectations standard is used in a specific
sense to identify the components of a particular close corporation shareholder's investment beyond a
proportionate share of the financial returns of the business. nl54
E. The Advantages of the Investment Model of Oppression
The investment model of oppression has a number of advantages over the present judicial applications of the oppression doctrine. First and foremost, the investment model provides a coherent
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ity interest in a close corporation does so not only in the hope of enjoying an increase in value of his
stake in the business but for the assurance of employment in the business in a managerial position."
(emphasis added)); In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1984) ("As a matter of
fact, providing employment for himself may have been the principal reason why he participated in
organizing the corporation." (internal quotation omitted)); In re Wiedy's Furniture Clearance Ctr.
Co., 487N.Y.S.2d901, 903 (App. Div. 1985) ("Although the exact amount of the capital contribution is disputed, petitioner utilized his own funds in getting this new venture underway, not simply
as an investment, but to provide employment and a future for himsef."); Murdock, supra note 28, at
468 ("That people often invest in a closely held corporation to provide a job is almost self-evident
...."); id. ("To deny a minority shareholder employment when a job was part of his rationale in investing is oppressive, as is the failure to pay dividends to nonemployee shareholders when employed shareholders are receiving de facto dividends through salaries." (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)); id. at 472 ("What is at stake in the 'oppression1 cases is often a job - a very attractive
job."); Alyse J. Ferraro, Note, Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc.: The Battle Between Ownership
and Employment in the Close Corporation, 8 Hofstra Lab. L.J. 193, 215 (1990) ("As the majority
emphasizes, Ingle was compensated for the sale of his shares, but to believe that the dollar amount
received met his expectations would be to dismiss his purpose in acquiring those shares. Ingle had
reasonably expected his employment to continue until he chose to retire or to acquire his own Ford
dealership....").
nl39. See, e.g., Schlafge, supra note 67, at 1077 n.29 ("Both [public corporation and close corporation] investors expect appreciation in the value of their investment. Investors in publicly held
corporations receive dividends as a form of return on this investment, while investors in closely
held corporations may expect to receive a salary and a management position as a condition of their
investment." (emphasis added)).
nl40. Thompson, supra note 28, at 216; see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
nl41. See, e.g., Kemp, 473 N.E.2dat 1179 (defining "oppressive actions" as "conduct that substantially defeats the 'reasonable expectations' held by minority shareholders in committing their
capital to the particular enterprise"); supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
nl42. See, e.g., Kemp, 473 N.E.2dat 1179. As the Kemp court explained:

A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her
to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those
expectations and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.

Id. (emphasis added).
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nl43. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2dat 664 (noting that the action of the majority disregarded a
longstanding stockholder policy that "employment with the corporation would go hand in hand with
stock ownership"); Merola v. Exergen Corp., 648 N.E.2d 1301, 1304 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (indicating that a fiduciary duty between shareholders is not at issue unless there is a "nexus between the
plaintiffs investment of capital and his employment in the corporation"), rev'd, 668 N.E.2d351
(Mass. 1996); id. at 1305 ("All that is required is the express, or reasonably under stood, coupling
of continuing employment with the employee's investment in the equity securities of the corporation

nl44. If the controlling shareholder can show a legitimate business purpose for conduct that
harms the investment of a close corporation shareholder, it is an interesting question whether liability for oppression should arise. See, e.g., Wilkes, 353 N.E.2dat 663 (concluding that there is no
breach of the enhanced fiduciary duty owed between close corporation shareholders if "the controlling group can demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for its action"); supra note 48. A full discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, but two general observations can be made.
On the one hand, the majority must be given the flexibility to run the business in a productive manner. To that end, it seems sensible to reject oppression liability when there is proof that the shareholder-employee's own misconduct or incompetence led to a termination of employment, removal
from the board, or other investment harm. Cf. Brenner v. Berkowitz, 634 A.2d 1019, 1033 (N.J.
1993) ("A shareholder's expectation of employment must be balanced against the corporation's ability to run its business efficiently."). Such a result could be justified within the investment model of
oppression by limiting the "reasonableness" of the expectation - i.e., by determining that a shareholder-employee can reasonably expect his investment to entitle him to employment or to a management role only to the extent that he continues to act in a competent and proper manner. Cf.
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400A.2d554, 562 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979) ("The
parties' expectation that plaintiff would at some time participate in management was likewise
thwarted by plaintiffs failure to satisfy the condition precedent to participation, i.e., that he learn the
business."); Gimpelv. Bolstein, 477N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017, 1019-20 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (observing that
"it was clearly not wrongful for the corporate victim of a theft to exclude the thief from the councils
of power," and noting that "the only expectations [a terminated shareholder-employee who stole
from the company] could reason ably entertain were those of a discovered thief: ostracism and
prosecution").
On the other hand, if a legitimate business purpose is broad enough to encompass justifications
unrelated to the employee's own conduct, such as a general business or economic down turn, denying relief to an oppressed shareholder-employee is troubling. When business or economic conditions decline, it seems appropriate for close corporation participants to share the losses proportionately rather than simply targeting the investment value of a particular share holder-employee.
nl45. A 10% shareholder, for example, has a general reasonable expectation that his investment
entitles him to 10% of the corporation's profits. See, e.g., Michaudv. Morris, 603 So. 2d 886, 888
(Ala. 1992) ("Certain basic expectations of investors are enforceable in the courts, and among those
is a right to share proportionally in corporate gains."); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,
507 P.2d 387, 397 (Or. 1973) ("It is also true that the Bakers, as stockholders, had a legitimate interest in the participation in profits earned by the corporation."). Thus, a proportionate share of the
earnings should be viewed as the core component of the shareholder's return on investment. See
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Robert W. Hamilton & Richard A. Booth, Business Basics for Law Students 8.6, at 200 (2d ed.
1998) ("The payment of a dividend is also the basic way in which investors receive their financial
return (short of selling their stock or interest or of the company liquidating).").
nl46. The decision of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.K2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984), supports the
notion thatfrustrationof the general reasonable expectation is oppressive, although the court did not
explicitly recognize the general expectation itself. In Kemp, two shareholder-employees ceased
working for a close corporation. One of the shareholder-employees, Dissin, resigned after having
been employed by the company for 42 years. See id. at 1176. The other shareholder- employee,
Gardstein, was terminated after having worked for the company for 35 years. See id. The corporation apparently had a policy of distributing the company's earnings in the form of dividends or "extra compensation bonuses" based upon each investor's proportionate owner ship. See id. at 1176,
1180. Gardstein did not challenge his termination of employment. Instead, both Gardstein and Dissin alleged that this distribution of corporate earnings "was no longer forthcoming" because the corporation had changed its policy from distributing based upon stock ownership to distributing based
upon services rendered to the corporation. See id. at 1176. In other words, Gardstein and Dissin alleged that their general reasonable expectation of proportionately sharing in corporate earnings as
stockholders was frustrated by the policy change that excluded nonemployees from any distribution
of earnings. See id. (noting that Gardstein and Dissin were particularly concerned with the fact that
"they no longer received any distribution of the company's earnings").
The findings of the lower courts were couched in general reasonable expectation language. The
referee considered oppression to arise when the controlling shareholders "have acted in such a manner as to defeat those expectations of the minority stockholders which formed the basis of [their]
participation in the venture." Id. (internal quotation omitted). Reciting the referee's findings, the
Kemp court noted that "petitioners were found to have invested capital in the company expecting,
among other things, to receive dividends or 'bonuses' based upon their stock holdings." Id. The referee also determined that "the expectations of petitioners that they would not be arbitrarily excluded
from gaining a return on their investment... were deemed defeated by prevailing corporate policies." Id. The appellate court confirmed the referee's report and concluded that "due to the corporation's new dividend policy petitioners had been pre vented from receiving any return on their investments." Id. Thus, the lower court findings of "oppressive action" appear to be premised upon
thefrustrationof Gardstein's and Dissin's general expectation that they, as stockholders, would proportionately share in the earnings of the corporation.
The court of appeals ultimately affirmed the finding of "oppressive action." See id. at 1180- 81.
Its analysis also reflected a belief that Gardstein's and Dissin's general expectation of a proportional
return was frustrated by the corporation's conduct. The court found that "there was uncontroverted
proof that this policy [of distributing earnings based upon stock ownership] was changed either
shortly before or shortly after petitioners' employment ended." Id. at 1180. The court reiterated
Gardstein's and Dissin's assertion that "receipt of this compensation, whether as true dividends or
disguised as 'extra compensation,' was a known incident to ownership of the company's stock understood by all of the company's principals." Id. Finally, echoing its belief that Gardstein and Dissin
had been frozen-out from the business returns, the Kemp court ob served that "it was not unreasonable for the fact finder to have determined that this change in policy amounted to nothing less than
an attempt to exclude petitioners from gaining any return on their investment through the mere recharacterization of distributions of corporate income." Id.
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nl47. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
nl48. See, e.g., supra notes 130, 146 and accompanying text.
nl49. In a public corporation, the stockholder commits his capital with the reasonable expectation that his investment entitles him to financial returns - i.e., a proportionate share of corporate
earnings (or liquidation proceeds). See, e.g., Exadaktilos, 400 A.2d at 560 ("Large corporations are
usually formed as a means of attracting capital through the sale of stock to investors, with no expectation of participation in corporate management or employment. Profit is expected through the
payment of dividends or sale of stock at an appreciated value."). The law does not recognize any
other expectation of the public corporation shareholder, such as an expectation that stock ownership
entitles the shareholder to a salaried job, as reasonable. See, e.g., id.; Schlafge, supra note 67, at
1073 n.14 (noting that the interest of the public corporation share holder is "limited to the amount of
their dollar investment in their shares, which can be sold at any time on the public market, and is not
tied to their salary and other employment benefits"). As a consequence, the investment of the public
corporation shareholder consists solely of a proportionate stake in the corporate earnings. For this
type of investment, a market exit pro vides adequate protection. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
In the close corporation, however, the typical stockholder commits his capital with the expectation that his investment entitles him not only to proportionate financial returns, but also to nonfinancial returns such as an employment position and a place in corporate management. See, e.g.,
Exadaktilos, 400 A.2dat 561. As the Exadaktilos court observed:

Unlike their counterparts in large corporations, [close corporation minority shareholders] may expect to participate in management or to influence operations, directly or indirectly, formally or informally. Furthermore, there generally is an expectation on the part of some participants that their
interest is to be recognized in the form of a salary derived from employment with the corporation.

Id. (citation omitted); see also Balvikv. Sylvester, 411 N. W.2d 383, 386 (N.D. 1987) ("It is generally understood that, in addition to supplying capital and labor to a contemplated enterprise and expecting a fair return, parties comprising the ownership of a close corporation expect to be actively
involved in its management and operation."); supra note 27 and accompanying text. The law generally recognizes these broader expectations as reasonable, and such recognition implies that the investment of a close corporation shareholder may consist of more than a proportionate stake in the
corporate earnings. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
The law's refusal to recognize broader reasonable expectations in the public corporation context,
but willingness to acknowledge them in the close corporation context, is not surprising. The law often develops as a product of expectations. Cf. Lynn M. LoPucki & Elizabeth Warren, Secured
Credit: A Systems Approach 718 (2d ed. 1998) ("It is possible to view these expectations as the
product of law... But it may be more useful to view the law as a product of those expectations.").

P a g e 56
1999 U. 1 1 1 . L. R e v .

517,

*

Shareholders of public corporations expect and understand that their in vestments do not entitle
them to corporate employment. Thus, the law's refusal to recognize broader expectations in the public corporation setting is consistent with the expectations of investors and does not adversely affect
the ability to attract capital. In the close corporation environment, however, investors committing
their capital generally expect employment and a management position in return. A refusal to recognize these broader expectations would put the law at odds with the general understandings of close
corporation investors and would very likely diminish available capital, thereby preventing some
small businesses from forming. As commentators have observed:

[A] potential source of much-needed risk capital for small business enterprises is threatened by the
prevalence of squeeze-outs... Undoubtedly, some persons, because of the dangers of oppression in a
close corporation, choose to purchase securities in public-issue corporations or even permit their
accumulated funds to remain idle rather than risk the purchase of a minority interest in a closely
held enterprise.

1 Oppression, supra note 28, 1.04, at 8.
nl50. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
nl51. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
nl52. See infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
nl53. Similarly, if a particular close corporation shareholder reasonably expects that her in
vestment entitles her to an active involvement in management, the investment and the management
role should be viewed as sufficiently linked, and the management role should be seen as part of the
value of the shareholder's investment. If the management role is then eliminated by termination or
otherwise, the shareholder's investment has been harmed and oppression liability can be found.
nl54. Cf. Murdock, supra note 28, at 465 (noting that when applying the reasonable expectations standard, "the crux is not identifying a traditional wrong but rather identifying the basis of the
bargain - what were the explicit or implicit conditions pursuant to which the parties associated
themselves together in the corporate form").
nl55. Ski Roundtop, Inc. v. Hall, 658 P.2d 1071, 1080 (Mont. 1983); see supra text accompanying note 53.
nl56. See, e.g., Webster v. Schauble, 400 P.2d292, 292, 294 (Wash. 1965) (stating that the
plaintiffs termination of employment was "a result of probably unfair and certainly ruthless treatment," but concluding that plaintiff had no remedy due to the employment at will doctrine).

